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I.  INTRODUCTION 
As this article goes to press, the United States faces “the most se-
vere financial crisis since the Great Depression.”1  The stock market has 
plummeted, wiping out $8.3 trillion in wealth.2  On March 5, 2009, the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average slid to 6,594.44,3 down from its high of 
14,164.53 on October 9, 2007.4  Banks are restricting lending,5 thus in-
terfering with consumer spending and businesses’ ability to pay costs—
let alone grow.6  As of June 2009, the unemployment rate had skyrock-
eted to 9.5% with 7 million more people unemployed than in December 
of 2007.7  Home prices have dropped in many areas, with prices in 20 
metropolitan areas declining by 18.7% from March 2008 to March 
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 1. FinancialStability.gov, The Financial Stability Plan: Deploying Our Full Arsenal to Attack 
the Credit Crisis on All Fronts, http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostabil ity/index.html (last 
visited July 2, 2009). 
 2. Vikas Bajaj & Jack Healey, Stocks Drop Sharply and Credit Markets Seize Up, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2008, at A1. 
 3. Jack Healy, Slump Humbling Blue-Chip Stocks, Once Dow’s Pride, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 
2009, at A1. 
 4. Dow Jones Industrial Average, The Dow Through History and Interactive Timeline, 
http://www.djaverages.com (last visited July 1, 2009). 
 5. Michael R. Crittenden & Meena Thiruvengadam, Treasury Finds No Rise In Bank Lending, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009 (“The survey suggests that the market for credit remains challenging 
despite efforts by the Treasury, Federal Reserve and other government agencies to unclog mar-
kets.”), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123491255580303683.html. 
 6. Richard A. Posner, Opinion, Capitalism in Crisis, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2009, at A17 
(“When the banking system breaks down and credit consequently seizes up, economic activity 
plummets.”). 
 7. Economic News Release, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Situation Summary for 
June 2009, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.nr0.htm/pp2 (last visited July 2, 2009). 
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2009.8  The foreclosure rate reached a record high of 3.85% in the first 
quarter of 2009.9 
Against this backdrop, and pursuant to authority granted by the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the United States De-
partment of the Treasury has implemented multiple programs to restore 
liquidity and stability to the financial system.  Two of those programs—
the Capital Purchase Program and the Capital Assistance Program—are 
designed to inject capital into the domestic financial institutions.  Al-
though the Treasury disputes that these programs “bail out” the banks,10 
the public commonly refers to these programs as the “bank bailout.” 
A key component of these programs is the so-called “equity kick-
er,” which permits the Treasury, on behalf of the taxpayers, to benefit 
from the improved financial health of the financial institutions.  Pursuant 
to the equity kicker, the Treasury has purchased preferred stock con-
vertible to common stock and common stock warrants from the partici-
pating financial institutions.  Congress has directed that the Treasury dis-
pose of these securities in such a way as to maximize returns for the tax-
payers. 
Unaddressed by Congress or the Treasury is the potential for the 
Treasury to rely on material, nonpublic information when disposing of 
these securities.  The Treasury, pursuant to contractual agreements with 
the financial institutions, has unfettered access to inside information 
about those institutions.  Moreover, the Treasury has access to material, 
nonpublic information about future governmental and quasi-
governmental conduct that could affect the price of bank securities. 
Current law does not curtail the Treasury’s ability to engage in in-
sider trading.  Although § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits 
insider trading, this provision does not apply to federal departments.  
Moreover, even if Congress extended the current prohibition on insider 
trading to governmental activity, not all of the government’s trading on 
the basis of material, nonpublic information about the banks or about 
future governmental or quasi-governmental action would fall within the 
scope of such a prohibition.  Further, any attempt to premise a common 
                                                 
 8. David Streitfeld, Home Prices Declined Again in March as Banks Sold More Foreclosed 
Properties, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2009, at B3 (reporting the results of the Standard & Poor’s Case–
Shiller Home Price Index 20-City Composite). 
 9. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Continue to 
Climb in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (May 28, 2009), http://www.mbaa.org/Newsa 
ndMedia/PressCenter/69031.htm. 
 10. FinancialStability.gov, Factsheet on Capital Purchase Program, http://www.financialstabi 
lity.gov/roadtostability/CPPfactsheet.htm (last visited July 2, 2009) [hereinafter CPP Factsheet] 
(“CPP is not a ‘bailout.’”). 
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law tort claim on governmental insider trading would be outside the 
scope of the Federal Torts Claim Act.  Finally, although there is a color-
able argument that governmental insider trading constitutes a breach of 
contract and a taking under the Fifth Amendment, this argument, even if 
successful, would be limited in application. 
Insider trading by the Treasury should, however, be constrained.  
Allowing the Treasury to trade on inside information would undercut the 
bailout’s goals of promoting overall faith in the markets and buttressing 
bank stock prices.  The potential for increased profits for the taxpayers 
does not outweigh the cost of decreased public confidence in the mar-
kets. 
Multiple potential solutions are available, including nationalizing 
the banks, prohibiting the Treasury from using inside information when 
making investment decisions, and imposing a “disclose or abstain” rule 
on the Treasury.  The best solution, however, is two-part and includes: 
(1) the imposition of an ethical wall between the persons making the in-
vestment decisions and the Treasury; and (2) the establishment of an in-
vestment plan that divests the Treasury of discretion over investment 
decisions. 
Part II of this article details how the bank bailout affords the Treas-
ury the motive and the opportunity to engage in insider trading on behalf 
of the taxpayers.  Part III examines previous bailouts in order to place the 
bank bailout in historical context and to exemplify the potential for in-
sider trading.  Part IV analyzes whether the current legal and regulatory 
system imposes restrictions on insider trading by the Treasury, and Part 
V argues that, despite the lack of current checks on governmental insider 
trading, insider trading by the Treasury should be inhibited.  Part VI ex-
amines multiple possible solutions and recommends the combination of 
an ethical wall and an investment plan. 
II.  THE BAILOUT AFFORDS THE TREASURY THE MOTIVE AND THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN INSIDER TRADING ON BEHALF OF THE 
TAXPAYERS 
The central purpose of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 
of 2008 (“the EES Act”) is “to immediately provide authority and facili-
ties that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and sta-
bility to the financial system of the United States.”11  At the same time, 
however, the EES Act mandates that such authority be used in a way that 
                                                 
 11. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2(1), 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5201(1)). 
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protects other important goals—such as maximizing overall returns for 
the taxpayers and providing public accountability for the exercise of the 
bailout authority.12 
A key component of the Treasury’s strategy pursuant to the EES 
Act is the injection of capital into the domestic financial institutions.  
The rationale is that more capital enables financial institutions to “take 
losses as they write down or sell troubled assets” and “supports lend-
ing.”13  Two of the programs implemented by the Treasury pursuant to 
this strategy—the Capital Purchase Program and the Capital Assistance 
Program—afford the government the motive and the opportunity to trade 
in bank stocks on behalf of the taxpayers while in possession of material, 
nonpublic information.  First, this section discusses how these programs, 
by granting the Treasury authority to make investment decisions about 
bank securities and access to inside information, afford the Treasury the 
opportunity to engage in insider trading.  Second, this section demon-
strates that the Treasury has the motive to engage in insider trading in 
order to maximize returns for the taxpayers.  Finally, this section proffers 
specific examples of how the Treasury could use this opportunity to en-
gage in insider trading for the benefit of the taxpayers. 
A.  The Treasury’s Opportunity to Engage in Insider Trading 
The Treasury has the opportunity to trade in bank securities while 
in possession of material, nonpublic information.  As explained in this 
section, the Treasury has the authority to make investment decisions 
about bank securities under the Capital Purchase Program and the Capital 
Assistance Program.  The Treasury also has access to nonpublic informa-
tion that could materially affect the price of bank securities. 
1.  The Treasury’s Authority to Make Investment Decisions about Bank 
Securities under the Capital Purchase Program 
The Treasury created the Capital Purchase Program (“the CPP”) in 
October 2008.14  With the goal of encouraging “U.S. financial institu-
tions to build capital to increase the flow of financing to U.S. businesses 
                                                 
 12. Id. § 2(2) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5201(2)).  Additional important goals listed 
in the Act are “protect[ing] home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings” and 
“preserv[ing] homeownership and promot[ing] jobs and economic growth.”  Id. 
 13. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Initial Section 105(a) Troubled Asset Relief Program Report to 
Congress for the Period of October 6, 2008 to November 30, 2008 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/105CongressionalReports/TARPfirst-105report.pdf. 
 14. FinancialStability.gov, Capital Purchase Program, http://www.financial stabil-
ity.gov/roadtostability/capitalpurchaseprogram.html (last visited July 2, 2009). 
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and consumers and to support the U.S. economy,” the CPP authorizes the 
Treasury to purchase up to $250 billion of senior preferred stock in quali-
fying banks.15  As of February 28, 2009, the Treasury had purchased 
$196.7 billion of preferred stock in 467 financial institutions.16 
In addition, pursuant to the CPP, the Treasury receives from the 
participating banks “warrants to purchase common stock with an aggre-
gate market price equal to 15 percent of the senior preferred invest-
ment.”17  The warrants’ exercise price is “the market price of the partici-
pating institution’s common stock at the time of issuance, calculated on a 
20-trading day trailing average.”18  These warrants allow the taxpayers to 
benefit from the improved health of the banks resulting from the CPP 
funds.19  As of March 30, 2009, the Treasury held unexercised warrants 
to purchase shares of common stock in 265 banks, many of which are 
publicly traded.20  For example, pursuant to the CPP, the Treasury re-
ceived a warrant to purchase 73,075,674 shares of Bank of America Cor-
poration common stock at an exercise price of $30.79 per share21 and a 
warrant to purchase 210,084,034 shares of Citigroup Inc. common stock 
at an exercise price of $17.85 per share.22 
If a financial institution repays the CPP preferred stock,23 the insti-
tution has the right to repurchase the warrants issued to the Treasury for 
“fair market value.”24  If the Treasury and the bank cannot agree on the 
                                                 
 15. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital Pur-
chase Program Description (Oct. 14, 2008), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm [here-
inafter October 14th Treasury Press Release]. 
 16. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Initial Section 105(a) Troubled Asset Relief Program Report to 
Congress for the Period February 1, 2009 to February 28, 2009 3 (2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/105CongressionalReports/105aReport_03062009.pdf. 
 17. October 14th Treasury Press Release, supra note 15. 
 18. Id. 
 19. CPP Factsheet, supra note 10. 
 20. U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Financial Stability, Troubled Asset Relief Program, 
Transactions Report for Period Ending March 27, 2009, Capital Purchase Program (2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/transaction_report_03-30-2009.pdf. 
 21. Securities Purchase Letter Agreement, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury-Bank of America Corp., 
sched. A, Oct. 26, 2008, http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/agreements/BOA_10262008.pdf. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, tit. VII, § 7001, 
123 Stat. 115 (amending Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 
111(g), 122 Stat. 3765 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5221)) (“[T]he Secretary shall permit a 
TARP recipient to repay any assistance previously provided under the TARP to such financial insti-
tution . . . .”).  As of June 19, 2009, 32 institutions had repaid approximately $70 billion to the Trea-
sury.  See also U.S. Treasury Department, Office of Financial Stability, Troubled Asset Relief Pro-
gram, Transactions Report for Period Ending June 19, 2009, Capital Purchase Program (2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/transaction-reports/transactions-report-062309.pdf. 
 24. Securities Purchase Agreement Standard Terms ¶ 4.9, http://www.financialstability.gov/ 
docs/CPP/spa.pdf (last visited July 7, 2009) [hereinafter Securities Purchase Agreement]; Financial-
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fair market value of the warrants, the two parties will follow an appraisal 
procedure to determine the value.25  In this scenario, the Treasury has 
little control over the timing of the warrants’ sale. 
If an institution repays the Treasury but fails to repurchase the war-
rants, however, the Treasury has the discretion to dispose of the warrants 
when and how it wishes.26  As originally enacted, the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“TARP”) required the Treasury to 
immediately liquidate warrants of a financial institution that had fully 
repaid TARP funds, but not repurchased the warrants.27  However, Con-
gress recently amended the Act to remove the requirement that the Trea-
sury liquidate warrants upon full repayment of TARP funds.28  Pursuant 
to its discretion, the Treasury has announced that its objective is to “dis-
pose of the government’s investments in individual companies as quickly 
as is practicable.”29 
With respect to financial institutions that have not repaid their pre-
ferred stock, the Treasury has complete discretion in the timing and 
means of disposing of the securities.  The Emergency Economic Stabili-
zation Act authorizes the Treasury to “sell, exercise, or surrender a war-
rant or any senior debt instrument received under this subsection,” sub-
ject only to the requirement that it act for the benefit of the taxpayers.30  
The Treasury solicited applications from equity asset managers to man-
                                                                                                             
Stability.gov, FAQs on Capital Purchase Program Repayment, http://www.financialstability.gov 
/docs/CPP/FAQ_CPP_guidance.pdf (last visited July 2, 2009) (“After repaying their CPP preferred 
stock, institutions also have the right to repurchase the warrants issued to Treasury for their ap-
praised market value.”). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Warrant Repurchase 
and Disposition Process for the Capital Purchase Program (June 26, 2009), http://www.financial 
stability.gov/latest/tg_06262009.html [hereinafter June 26th Treasury Press Release] (“If an issuer 
chooses not to repurchase the warrants according to its existing contractual rights, Treasury has the 
discretion to dispose of the warrants as it sees fit over time.”). 
 27. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, § 7001 (amending Emergency 
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 111(g), 122 Stat. 3765 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5221)) (“[W]hen such assistance is repaid, the Secretary shall liquidate 
warrants associated with such assistance at the current market price.”); FniancialStability.gov, FAQs 
Addressing Capital Purchase Program (CPP) Changes Under the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009, (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CPP/CPP-FAQs.pdf (“If 
your bank does not choose to exercise its option to repurchase the warrants, Treasury will attempt to 
liquidate registered warrants as soon as possible.”). 
 28. Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 403, 123 Stat. 
1632, 1658 (codified as amended at 12 USC § 5221(g)). 
 29. June 26th Treasury Press Release, supra note 26. 
 30. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 113(d)(2)(B) 
(codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5223(d)(2)(B)). 
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age its vast portfolio31 and on April 22, 2009, announced that it had hired 
three firms to manage its investments.32  The asset managers will advise 
the Treasury on optimal disposition of the portfolio,33 but the “Treasury 
will determine the ultimate disposition of holdings or otherwise issue 
disposition guidance in its Investment Policy and Guidelines.”34 
2.  The Treasury’s Authority to Make Investment Decisions About Bank 
Securities under the Capital Assistance Program 
On February 25, 2009, four months after the implementation of the 
CPP, the Treasury announced the terms of the Capital Assistance Pro-
gram (“the CAP”).35  Like the CPP, the CAP’s purpose is to shore up the 
capital of banks in order to “ensure the continued ability of U.S. financial 
institutions to lend to creditworthy borrowers in the face of a weaker than 
expected economic environment and larger than expected potential 
losses.”36  The CAP has two components: (1) a forward-looking capital 
assessment of 19 major U.S. banking organizations (the so-called “stress 
test”); and (2) the Treasury’s purchase of additional securities from eligi-
ble, publicly traded financial institutions.37 
Unlike the preferred stock purchased pursuant to the CPP, the pre-
ferred stock purchased pursuant to the CAP will be convertible into 
common stock.38  The conversion price will be set at 90% of the average 
closing price on the twenty trading days preceding February 10, 2009.39  
                                                 
 31. CPP Factsheet, supra note 10. 
 32. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs, Treasury Hires Asset 
Managers under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (Apr. 22, 2009), 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg100.html. 
 33. Id. (explaining that the asset managers’ role would include “advising on and executing 
transactions in accordance with the Treasury’s investment policy”). 
 34. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Notice to Financial Institutions Interested in Providing 
Asset Management Services for a Portfolio of Equity Securities, Debt Obligations, and Warrants 
Issued by Financial Institutions 3, (2008), http://www.financialstability.gov/about/solicitations.html 
[hereinafter Notice to Financial Institutions]. 
 35. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Treasury Releases Terms of Capital 
Assistance Program, (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg40.htm [hereinafter 
February 25th Treasury Press Release]. 
 36. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TREASURY WHITE PAPER, THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM AND ITS ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN 1, available at http://www.treas.gov/ 
press/releases/reports /tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY WHITE PAPER]. 
 37. Id. at 2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 4; U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Capital Assis-
tance Program, Summary of Mandatorily Convertible Preferred Stock (“Convertible Preferred”) 
Terms 3, http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40_captermsheet.pdf [hereinafter Capital 
Assistance Program Term Sheet].  The conversion price will be reduced if stockholder consent is 
required and not obtained for the issuance of common shares upon conversion. 
8 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 33:1 
 
The banks have the discretion, subject to regulatory approval, to convert 
the shares into equity when “needed to preserve lending in [a] worse-
than-expected economic environment.”40  Moreover, at the expiration of 
seven years, if the convertible preferred shares have not already been 
redeemed or converted, the conversion into common equity is auto-
matic.41  Therefore, unless the financial institution repurchases the con-
vertible preferred stock before it converts into common equity, the 
Treasury will own common stock in the banks. 
Moreover, institutions receiving capital pursuant to the CAP will is-
sue warrants to the Treasury for the purchase of common stock.42  The 
exercise price will be equal to the conversion price for the convertible 
preferred stock.43  The Treasury will receive enough warrants to purchase 
common stock having an aggregate market value, based on the conver-
sion price, equal to 20% of the convertible preferred amount on the date 
of investment.44 
As noted above, under the EES Act, the Treasury has the authority, 
subject to the requirement that it act for the benefit of the taxpayers, to 
dispose of the banks’ securities as it sees fit.45  Pursuant to this authority, 
the Treasury will place the securities received through the CAP in a Fi-
nancial Stability Trust, which is a “separate trust set up to manage the 
government’s investments in US financial institutions.”46  The trustees’ 
objective “will be to protect and create value for the taxpayer as a share-
holder over time.”47  In addition, the Treasury has committed to “make 
reasonable efforts to sell on an annual basis an amount of common stock 
equal to at least 20% of the total common stock” owned by the Treasury 
on the mandatory conversion date, with the goal of eliminating public 
ownership of common stock.48 
The identities of the trustees have not been publicly disclosed, so it 
is not clear whether they will be government officials or private citizens.  
In addition, the terms of the trust have not been disclosed, so it is uncer-
tain whether the Treasury will retain ultimate decision-making authority 
                                                 
 40. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 3. 
 41. February 25th Treasury Press Release, supra note 35. 
 42. Capital Assistance Program Term Sheet, supra note 39, at 7. 
 43. Id. at 3.  The conversion price will be reduced if stockholder consent is required and not 
obtained for the issuance of common shares upon exercise of the warrants. 
 44. Id. at 3. 
 45. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 113(d), 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5223(d)). 
 46. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 3. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Capital Assistance Program Term Sheet, supra note 39, at 6. 
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about the disposition of the trust assets.49  Finally, the Treasury has not 
issued any guidelines restricting the flow of information from the Treas-
ury to the trustees. 
3.  The Treasury’s Access to Material, Nonpublic Information Affecting 
Bank Securities 
In addition to its authority to trade in bank securities, the Treasury 
has access to the following nonpublic information that may affect bank 
securities: (1) inside information about the banks themselves, and (2) 
information about future governmental or quasi-governmental action. 
Pursuant to the CPP and the CAP, the Treasury has access to inside 
information about the banks.  The standard Securities Purchase Agree-
ment between the Treasury and the bank under the CPP contains the fol-
lowing provision: 
From the Signing Date until the date when the Investor holds an 
amount of Preferred Shares having an aggregate liquidation value of 
less than 10% of the Purchase Price,50 the Company will permit the 
Investor and its agents, consultants, contractors and advisors (x) act-
ing through the Appropriate Federal Banking Agency, to examine 
the corporate books and make copies thereof and to discuss the af-
fairs, finances and accounts of the Company and the Company Sub-
sidiaries with the principal officers of the Company, all upon rea-
sonable notice and at such reasonable times and as often as the In-
vestor may reasonably request and (y) to review any information 
material to the Investor’s investment in the Company provided by 
the Company to its Appropriate Federal Banking Agency.51 
The Treasury promises to “use reasonable best efforts” to maintain 
the confidentiality of this information, but there is no requirement that 
the Treasury not rely upon this information when making investment 
decisions.52  Similarly, financial institutions receiving capital pursuant to 
the CAP will undoubtedly enter into a Securities Purchase Agreement 
                                                 
 49. For example, if the trust is revocable, the trustee will have a duty to comply with the Treas-
ury’s direction even if “the direction is contrary to the terms of the trust or the trustee’s normal fidu-
ciary duties.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 (2007).  Even if the trust is not revocable, it 
may reserve to the Treasury “a power to direct or otherwise control certain conduct of the trustee,” 
thus imposing a duty on the trustee to comply with the Treasury’s directions, “unless the attempted 
exercise is contrary to the terms of the trust or power or the trustee knows or has reason to believe 
that the attempted exercise violates a fiduciary duty that the power holder owes to the beneficiaries.”  
Id. § 75. 
 50. In other words, the Treasury has the right to access the bank’s inside information until the 
Treasury has disposed of 90% of its Preferred Stock in the bank. 
 51. Securities Purchase Agreement, supra note 24, ¶ 3.5(a). 
 52. Id. ¶ 3.5(b). 
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with the Treasury.  The terms of the standard agreement for CAP securi-
ties purchases are not yet publicly available, but it is probable that the 
agreement will contain a similar provision affording the Treasury access 
to inside information about the participating financial institutions. 
Moreover, the “stress test” component of the CAP gives the Treas-
ury access to forward-looking information that is not necessarily publicly 
available.  The results of the stress tests themselves—namely, each fi-
nancial institution’s “expected losses and the resources to absorb those 
losses if economic conditions were to be more adverse than generally 
expected”53—are publicly available.54  These estimates are based, how-
ever, on detailed data supplied by the financial institutions.55  For in-
stance, the financial institutions disclosed “extensive information on the 
characteristics of loan, trading, and securities portfolios and modeling 
methods.”56  This data underlying the stress test results is not publicly 
available. 
In addition to access to material inside information about the finan-
cial institutions themselves, the Treasury has access to nonpublic infor-
mation about future governmental and quasi-governmental action.  First 
and foremost, the Treasury has knowledge of its own future conduct, in-
cluding that of its bureaus and offices,57 in managing the United States’ 
financial system.58  Therefore, the Treasury has access to advance know-
ledge about new Treasury programs and guidelines, changes in the regu-
latory requirements for financial institutions, and enforcement actions, all 
of which could affect the stock price of a financial institution.  Moreover, 
as a member of the Cabinet, the Treasury Secretary has access to infor-
                                                 
 53. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 2. 
 54. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, The Supervisory Capital Assessment Pro-
gram: Overview of Results (May 7, 2009), http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/SCAPresults.pdf. 
 55. Id. at 1 (explaining that the stress test estimates “benefit from the input of extremely de-
tailed information collected from each of the 19 BHCs” [bank holding companies]). 
 56. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program: 
Design and Implementation 2 (Apr. 24, 2009), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/ 
press/bcreg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf. 
 57. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which is a bureau of the Treasury Depart-
ment, “charters, regulates, and supervises all national banks.”  Comptroller of the Currency, Admin-
istrator of National Banks, About the OCC, http://www.occ.treas.gov/aboutocc.htm (last visited July 
3, 2009).  The Office of Thrift Supervision, which is an office within the Treasury Department, “is 
the federal bank regulator and supervisor of a dynamic and diverse industry of savings associations 
and their subsidiaries spread across the nation.”  Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS Profile, 
http://www.ots.treas.gov/?p=OTSProfile (last visited July 3, 2009). 
 58. The Treasury’s mission is to “[s]erve the American people and strengthen national security 
by managing the U.S. Government’s finances effectively, promoting economic growth and stability, 
and ensuring the safety, soundness, and security of the U.S. and international financial systems.”  
United States Department of the Treasury, Duties & Functions of the U.S. Department of the Treas-
ury, http://www.ustreas.gov/education/duties/ (last visited July 3, 2009). 
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mation about the administration’s plans in areas beyond the United 
States’ financial system, such as international relations, which could af-
fect the price of bank securities.59  Finally, the EES Act created a Finan-
cial Stability Oversight Board to, among other duties, make “recommen-
dations, as appropriate, to the Secretary regarding use of the authority 
under this chapter.”60  The five members of the Board are the Treasury 
Secretary, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, the Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the 
Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission, and the Secretary of 
Housing and Urban Development.61  As a result, the Treasury Secretary, 
when making investment decisions, could potentially have knowledge 
about future interest rate adjustments,62 future housing policies and in-
centives, and future SEC regulatory requirements that could be material 
to the market when pricing bank securities. 
B.  The Treasury’s Motive to Engage in Insider Trading 
As established above, the Treasury has the authority to make in-
vestment decisions about bank securities and has access to nonpublic 
information that could affect the price of bank stocks.  In addition, the 
Treasury has the motive to rely on this inside information when making 
investment decisions.  Unlike the usual insider-trading scenario in which 
                                                 
 59. See The White House, The Administration: The Cabinet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
administration/cabinet/ (last visited July 3, 2009). 
 60. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 104(a)(2), 122 
Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5214(a)(2)). 
 61. Id. § 104(b)(1)–(5) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5214(b)(1)–(5)). 
 62. It is common knowledge that interest rates and common stock prices usually move in oppo-
site directions.  Joseph H. Ellis, Choppy Markets Ahead?  Interest Rates and the Stock Market: A 
Concerned Look Forward from a New Book by a Renowned Forecaster, FIN. PLAN., Oct. 1, 2005, at 
2 (“Even casual observers of the stock market recognize that there is an inverse relationship between 
interest rates and stock valuations.”).  The relationship between interest rates and warrant prices is 
more complicated.  An increase in interest rates imposes two opposite pressures on the price of the 
warrant: (1) it tends to depress stock prices, which imposes a downward pressure on warrant prices; 
and (2) it tends to make the option of purchasing a warrant, rather than a share of stock, more attrac-
tive because the upfront money saved can receive a higher rate of return.  This dual impact of inter-
est rates is reflected in the Black–Scholes method of warrant pricing.  Under the Black–Scholes 
method, a decrease in the spot stock price (an effect of increased interest rates) decreases the call 
premium of a warrant, but an increase in interest rates increases the call premium.  ROBERT WARD, 
OPTIONS AND OPTIONS TRADING 195–201 (2004).  It is not clear which of these two pressures is 
stronger.  Arguably, however, the effect on stock price would be stronger in stock-sensitive indus-
tries like automobile sales and financial services, resulting in an inverse correlation between warrant 
prices and interest rates. 
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the trader is motivated by self-enrichment,63 the Treasury is motivated to 
maximize profits for the taxpayers. 
Congress has repeatedly directed the Treasury Secretary to maxi-
mize returns on investments for the benefit of the taxpayers.  First, one of 
the identified purposes of the EES Act is to ensure that the Secretary of 
the Treasury uses the authority and facilities provided by the Act “in a 
manner that . . . maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United 
States.”64  Second, the EES Act specifically instructs the Secretary to 
take into account the protection of “the interests of taxpayers by maxi-
mizing overall returns and minimizing the impact on the national debt” 
when exercising his or her authority under the Act.65 
The Treasury itself has incorporated this focus on maximizing re-
turns into the CPP and the CAP.  With respect to securities the Treasury 
receives under the CPP, the Treasury’s “primary policy goal in managing 
the portfolio . . . is to protect the interests of taxpayers in light of the 
Treasury’s stake in public and private Financial Institutions.”66  Simi-
larly, with respect to securities the Treasury receives under the CAP, the 
stated objective when disposing of them “will be to protect and create 
value for the taxpayer as a shareholder over time.”67 
C.  Specific Scenarios of Potential Insider Trading by the Treasury 
As detailed above, pursuant to the CPP and the CAP, the Treasury 
owns, or will own, common stock and warrants to purchase common 
stock of publicly-traded financial institutions.  The Treasury will have 
several options when disposing of these securities—not all of which af-
ford the Treasury the potential to benefit from its superior knowledge: 
(1) the Treasury could sell the warrants back to the financial institution; 
(2) the Treasury could sell the common stock back to the financial insti-
tution; (3) the Treasury could sell the warrants or the common stock to 
an institutional investor, or both; and (4) the Treasury could exercise the 
warrants and sell the common stock on the open market to the investing 
public.  At the same time, the Treasury will potentially have access to 
inside information about the financial institutions themselves and about 
                                                 
 63. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 171–189 (1966) (rec-
ognizing that government officials “are frequently privy to valuable information about a corpora-
tion’s shares” and discussing insider trading by government officials for their own benefit). 
 64. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 2(2)(C) (codified as amended in 12 
U.S.C. § 5201(2)(C)). 
 65. Id. § 103(1)–(2) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5213(1)). 
 66. CPP Factsheet, supra note 10 (“The program is designed to generate a positive return over 
time to the taxpayer.”); Notice to Financial Institutions, supra note 34, at 2. 
 67. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 2. 
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future governmental or quasi-governmental actions that could affect the 
price of the financial institutions’ securities. 
To the extent the Treasury sells the warrants or the common stock 
back to the financial institution, the Treasury’s access to inside informa-
tion about that financial institution would not benefit the Treasury.  Un-
like cases in which an insider buys or sells stock from the company 
without disclosing secret information about the company (such as in 
“cooked books” scenarios), the Treasury would not have superior knowl-
edge of inside information about the companies themselves.68  In these 
scenarios, therefore, the Treasury would only be able to profit from its 
superior knowledge about future governmental and quasi-governmental 
conduct. 
To the extent the Treasury sells the warrants or the common stock 
to an institutional investor, the Treasury could potentially profit from its 
superior knowledge about the financial institution itself and about future 
governmental and quasi-governmental conduct.  Institutional investors, 
however, when engaging in securities transactions with the government, 
would presumably be sophisticated enough to factor this risk into the 
pricing of the securities.  Thus, the Treasury’s ability to profit from its 
superior knowledge would likely be muted. 
The Treasury could profit most from its superior access to informa-
tion by selling common stock on the open market.  First, it would have 
superior knowledge about the financial institution itself and about future 
governmental and quasi-government conduct.  Second, investors trading 
through the exchange would likely be unaware that the Treasury was 
selling its shares, thus limiting the discounting effect from the Treasury’s 
access to this information.  Finally, members of the public are less likely 
to be sophisticated enough to factor the Treasury’s access to nonpublic 
information into the pricing of a financial institution’s stock. 
III.  PREVIOUS BAILOUTS EXEMPLIFY THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTIVE AND 
OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE IN INSIDER TRADING ON BEHALF OF THE 
TAXPAYERS 
The government has twice before exacted common stock warrants 
in return for federal relief: first, pursuant to the Chrysler Corporation 
Loan Guarantee Act and second, pursuant to the Air Transportation Safe-
                                                 
 68. See DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, 18 INSIDER TRADING REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT AND 
PREVENTION § 3:18 (2009). 
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ty and System Stabilization Act. 69  While there is no indication that the 
government misused inside information in the eventual disposition of the 
Chrysler or airline warrants, the circumstances surrounding their disposi-
tion exemplify the potential for abuse and place the bank bailout in his-
torical context.  The potential for insider trading is exacerbated under the 
CPP and CAP, which far exceed the scope of the prior programs. 
A.  Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act 
1.  Issuance and Disposition of Chrysler Warrants 
In 1980, with Chrysler facing “bankruptcy and possible liquida-
tion,”70 Congress enacted the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee 
Act.71  The Act established a Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee 
Board (“the Board”), whose voting members were the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System and the Comptroller General of the United States.72  The 
Act authorized the Board to guarantee up to $1.5 billion of loans to 
Chrysler.73 
In exchange for the loan guarantees, Congress charged the Board 
with ensuring that the government was “compensated for the risk as-
sumed in making guarantees.”74  Pursuant to this charge, the Board nego-
tiated with Chrysler to obtain warrants to buy 14.4 million shares of 
common stock from Chrysler at the price of $13.00 per share until 
1990.75 
In May 1983, the Board determined that it was time to reap the 
benefits from the bailout.76  Chrysler had recovered its financial viability 
                                                 
 69. Robert F. Bruner, Chrysler’s Warrants: September 1983, Darden Case No. UVA-F-0682, 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=909046 (“[I]n the long history of government loan guarantees, 
there were no examples of equity kickers [prior to the Chrysler guarantees].”). 
 70. H.R. REP. NO. 96-690, (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2787, 2789. 
 71. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 825 
(1980). 
 72. Id. § (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1862) (repealed 1983).  The Secretary of Labor 
and the Secretary of Transportation were “ex officio nonvoting members of the Board.”  Id. 
 73. Id. § 8 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1867(a)) (repealed 1983). 
 74. Id. § 5 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1864(d)) (repealed 1983).  In order to accom-
plish this purpose, the Act explicitly authorized the Board to “prescribe and collect a guarantee fee,” 
“enter into contracts under which the Government . . . would participate in gains of the Corporation 
or its security holders,” or “use other instruments deemed appropriate by the Board.”  Id. 
 75. James M. Bickley, Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979: Background, Provi-
sions, and Cost 5 (Cong. Research Serv., Report No. R40005, 2008), available at 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1575&context=key_workplace. 
 76. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Chrysler Asking the U.S. to Forgo Profit It Could Make On Loan 
Aid, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1983, at 1. 
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and was on the verge of repaying in full the federally guaranteed loans.77  
Chrysler’s common stock was trading around $26 per share,78 about $13 
more than the warrant price.  The Board had two options: (1) accept bids 
for the warrants or (2) exercise the warrants and sell the stock on the 
open market.79  The Board ultimately decided to accept bids from un-
derwriters and from Chrysler.80 
In September 1983, after a competitive bidding process, the Board 
agreed to sell the warrants to Chrysler for $311.1 million, or $21.60 per 
warrant.81  If the Board had instead exercised the warrants and immedi-
ately sold the stock at the market price, the Board would have gained a 
profit of only about $17 per share.82 
2.  Circumstances Surrounding Disposition of Chrysler Warrants 
The Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Board had potential ac-
cess to nonpublic information about Chrysler and about future govern-
mental or quasi-governmental action affecting Chrysler’s stock price.  
There is no indication that the Board used this information to its advan-
tage when assessing the timing of the sale of the Chrysler stock warrants, 
but the circumstances demonstrate the potential for such a use. 
The Board had access to myriad inside information about Chrysler.  
Similar to the access afforded the Treasury under the CPP, the Board was 
afforded unfettered access to Chrysler’s “accounts, books, records, me-
moranda, correspondence, and other documents and transactions of the 
Corporation” until the loans were repaid.83  In addition, in exchange for 
the loan guarantees, Chrysler agreed to allow the General Accounting 
Office to audit Chrysler whenever deemed appropriate by the Comptrol-
                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. The highest closing price in May of 1983 was $28.25 on May 9, 1983, and the lowest was 
$25.125 on May 3, 1983.  See Historical Stock Prices of Chrysler Corporation, CUSIP # 17119610, 
available at LexisNexis.com [hereinafter Historical Stock Prices of Chrysler Corp.]. 
 79. Hershey, Jr., supra note 76, at 1. 
 80. Robert D. Hershey, Jr., U.S. Plans to Sell Rights in Chrysler, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1983, at 
1. 
 81. Bickley, supra note 75, at 5; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Chrysler Offer By Shearson,  N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1983, at D1; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Chrysler Top Bids to Buy Back Stock Rights,  
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1983, at A1. 
 82. The highest closing price in September of 1983 was $31.375 on September 26, 1983, and 
the lowest price was $28.375 on September 1, 1983.  See Historical Stock Prices of Chrysler Corp., 
supra note 78.  The exercise price on the warrants was $13 per share. 
 83. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, § 10(a), 93 Stat. 
825 (1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1869(a)) (repealed 1983); H.R. REP. NO. 96-690, 
(1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2787, 2803 (“Section 7 authorizes the Treasury Department 
to inspect all documents of the corporation at any time a guarantee is requested or outstanding.”). 
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ler General of the United States.84  For example, the Board may have 
known that Chrysler’s earning reports in late 1983 and early 1984 would 
be unexpectedly positive.85 
The Board also had potential access to nonpublic information about 
future governmental or quasi-governmental actions that could affect the 
value of its Chrysler warrants.  For example, the Board had potential ac-
cess to information about future adjustments to the federal funds rate.  
The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
was one of three voting members of the Board, potentially providing the 
Board with an indication about future interest rate adjustments.86  Indeed, 
the Fed raised interest rates after the Chrysler warrants were sold.  After 
a slight decrease in the federal funds rate to around 9.25 or 9.5 in early 
October of 1983, the federal funds rate gradually increased to 10.5 by 
mid-April 1984 and to 11.5 or 11.75 in late August 1984.87 
Finally, the Board had potential access to information about future 
policy on trade with Japan.  The Secretary of the Treasury, another vot-
ing member of the Board,88 was also a member of the Cabinet Council on 
Commerce and Trade,89 potentially providing the Board with an indica-
tion about future trade policy.  In the early 1980s, the United States’ au-
tomakers, and perhaps Chrysler most of all because of its production of 
small cars, were extremely vulnerable to competition from Japanese au-
                                                 
 84. Id. § 10(b) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1869(b)) (repealed 1983); H.R. REP. NO. 
96-690, (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2787, 2803 (“Section 7 also authorizes the Comp-
troller General of the United States to make any audits of the corporation and its borrowers which he 
considers necessary . . . .”). 
 85. Chrysler’s Iacocca Says 1st Period Net Topped Analysts’ Expectations, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
16, 1984, at 1 (reporting that analysts had “forecast that Chrysler will report net income of around 
$600 million, or $4.90 a share”); Amal Nag, Chrysler Posts 4th-Period Net Despite Charge, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 24, 1984, at 1 (“The nation’s No. 3 auto maker posted record full-year net of $700.9 
million, or $5.79 a share, after the write-down on its Peugeot investment.”); Donald Woutat, Chrsy-
ler Corp. Net Quadrupled For 1st Quarter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1984, at 1 (“Chrysler Corp. re-
ported that first-quarter profit more than quadrupled from a year earlier to $705.8 million, or $5.64 a 
share, setting a record for the period and exceeding the amount earned in any full year.”) (character-
izing Chrysler’s results as “better than expected”). 
 86. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, § 3 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
1862) (repealed 1983). 
 87. See Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Historical Changes of the Target Federal Funds 
and Discount Rates, 1971 to present, http://newyorkfed.org/markets/statistics/dlyrates/fedrate.html 
(last visited July 3, 2009). 
 88. Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, § 3 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
1862) (repealed 1983). 
 89. Stuart Auerbach, Reagan Rejects Meese’s Plea to Back Bill Aiding Wineries, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 17, 1984, at A2 (identifying the members of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade); 
Dick Kirschten, Embargo Politics, 13 NAT’L J. 792, May 2, 1981 (same).  In addition, the Treasury 
Secretary chaired another committee dealing with trade, the Senior Interagency Group on Interna-
tional Economic Policy.  Protecting America’s Free Trade, THE ECONOMIST, March 2, 1985, at 80. 
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tomakers.90  In 1981, at the urging of the Reagan Administration and in 
response to the threat that Congress might enact strict import quotas, Ja-
pan imposed “voluntary” quotas on its auto exports to the U.S.91  These 
quotas were set to expire on March 31, 1985,92 to the anxiety of U.S. au-
tomakers, including Chrysler.93  On February 19, 1985, President Rea-
gan’s Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade unanimously recom-
mended that the President decline to request the extension of the volun-
tary quotas.94  On March 1, 1985, accepting his cabinet’s recommenda-
tion, President Reagan announced that he would not ask Japan to extend 
its voluntary quotas.95 
Although the Board potentially had access to nonpublic informa-
tion, there is no indication that the Board used this information in timing 
the sale of the warrants.  With respect to inside information about Chrys-
ler’s earnings, the Board sold the warrants to Chrysler itself, and thus the 
purchaser presumably had at least equal access to this information. 
The effect of an increased federal funds rate on the price of Chrys-
ler’s stock warrants is more complicated to track.  On the one hand, au-
tomobile stocks are often viewed as especially sensitive to interest rates 
because higher rates can make auto financing less attractive, which caus-
es downward pressure on the warrant prices.96  On the other hand, an 
                                                 
 90. Ford, Chrysler Debt Upgraded by S&P; GM’s Left Unchanged, WALL ST. J., May 22, 
1984, at 1 (“S&P said [that] Chrysler remains the most vulnerable to competition from Japanese cars 
if the current import quotas are lifted in April 1985 . . . .”); Art Pine, Japan’s Auto Export Limit 
Should End, Cabinet Group Formally Recommends, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1985, at 1 (“If the quotas 
are lifted, Chrysler Corp. would suffer the most because of its concentration on the small car mar-
ket.”). 
 91. Clyde H. Farnsworth, End of Bar to Japan’s Cars Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1985, at D1 
(“The Japanese have been willing to follow Washington’s advice each year because of the implicit—
and at times explicit—threat that Congress might enact even tougher curbs.”); Robert A. Rosenblatt, 
Surge of Auto Imports Seen If Restraints End, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1985, at 1 (“The ‘voluntary’ 
quotas were established by Japan in 1981 after intense pressure from the Reagan Administration.”). 
 92. Farnsworth, supra note 91 (identifying the expiration date). 
 93. Id. (“Chrysler’s vice chairman . . . has warned that 750,000 American jobs could be lost if 
the restraints were ended.”); Urban C. Lehner, Speculation on Easing of Auto-Import Curbs Has an 
Impact on Stocks, Especially Subaru’s, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1985, at 1 (“Most analysts agree that 
an outright removal of the quotas would depress Ford and Chrysler share prices.”). 
 94. Pine, supra note 90; Stuart Auerbach & David Hoffman, U.S. Expected to Let Japanese 
Car Quotas Lapse, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1985, at F1. 
 95. Clyde H. Farnsworth, U.S. Will Not Ask Japan to Extend Car Export Curbs, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 2, 1985, at 1. 
 96. Kenneth N. Gilpin, The Markets: Stocks & Bonds; Dow Rises for a 3rd Session as Profits 
Exceed Forecasts, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2000, at C10 (quoting the head of block trading at Morgan 
Stanley Dean Witter as identifying “papers, chemical, metals and autos” as “rate-sensitive areas”); 
Suzanne McGee, Bond Prices Finish Lower After Early Gains As Market Prepares for Treasury-
Note Auctions, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1996, at C23 (“Like housing, automobile purchases that re-
quire financing are believed to be sensitive to interest rates, falling as those financing costs rise.”); 
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increase in interest rates tends to make the option of purchasing a war-
rant—rather than a share of stock—more attractive, causing an upward 
pressure on the warrants prices.97  On balance, there is no indication that 
the Board relied on information about future interest rate hikes when tim-
ing the sale of the warrants. 
Finally, although the Board potentially had knowledge about the fu-
ture direction of the Reagan Administration’s policy on Japanese quotas, 
the sale of the Chrysler warrants occurred eighteen months before Presi-
dent Reagan’s announcement that he would not seek further voluntary 
quotas from Japan.  Moreover, knowledge about the likely recommenda-
tion of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade was not necessarily 
indicative of an increase in Japanese imports.  First, although unlikely, 
the President might have rejected the Council’s recommendation.  Sec-
ond, Japan might have nonetheless chosen to impose a voluntary quota.  
And, in fact, that is exactly what Japan did, albeit imposing a far more 
generous quota than the one previously imposed.98  In light of the length 
of time between the sale of the warrants and the inherent uncertainty 
about the effect of the Cabinet Council’s recommendation, there is no 
reason to suspect that the Board timed the sale of the warrants to avoid 
the depressing effect of increased Japanese imports on the sale price of 
the Chrysler warrants. 
                                                                                                             
Robert O’Brien, GM, Ford Climb on Expectations The Fed Will Lower Rates Again, WALL ST. J., 
June 22, 2001, at C2 (“Auto makers and other stocks tied to the economy rose amid hope that the 
Fed will cut interest rates again.”); Anthony Ramirez, Dow Swings Wildly, Ends Down by 4.05, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 1993, at D12 (“A fourth, automobile stocks, may become part of that group [of 
stocks groups depressing the S & P 500] if high interest rates make auto financing unattractive.”); 
Leonard Sloane, Dow Drops 5.38 as Market Loses Almost 102 for Week, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1994 
(“Among the economically sensitive stocks, auto issues were lower amid fears that consumer bor-
rowing might slow down if interest rates are increased.”); but see Steven E. Levingston, Stock, Bond 
Markets Go Separate Way As Investors Seek Profit-Driven Shares, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1994, at C1 
(“To counter the rise in interest rates, investors have dumped interest-rate sensitive stocks such as 
banks and utilities and snapped up earnings-driven stocks such as heavy machinery and auto mak-
ers.”). 
 97. See WARD, supra note 62, at 195–201. 
 98. Michael White, US Car Makers Angry at New Japanese Quota, GUARDIAN, Mar. 29, 1985 
(“The Japanese government’s decision to allow car exports to the United States rise by 450,000—or 
24 per cent—in the coming year appears to have got the worst of both worlds in terms of US reac-
tion.  Car makers and their allies are angry that the quota is too big and the Reagan Administration is 
disappointed that the Japanese have set any quotas at all.”). 
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B.  Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act 
1.  Issuance and Disposition of Airline Warrants 
On September 22, 2001, in the wake of the economic devastation of 
airlines caused by the terrorist attacks, Congress passed the Air Trans-
portation Safety and System Stabilization Act.99  The Act authorized the 
government to guarantee up to $10 billion in loans to qualifying air-
lines.100 
The Act established the Air Transportation Stabilization Board to 
decide on applications for loans.101  The Act also mandated that the gov-
ernment be “compensated for the risk assumed in making guarantees un-
der this title.”102  Congress left to the Board’s discretion whether to ac-
complish this goal with “warrants, stock options, common or preferred 
stock, or other appropriate equity instruments.”103 
The Board approved loan guarantees to five publicly traded airlines.  
The Board guaranteed $429 million of America West Airlines debt104 in 
exchange for warrants to purchase 18.75 million shares of the company’s 
Class B common stock.105  American Trans Air received $148.5 million 
in loan guarantees106 in exchange for warrants to purchase 1.478 million 
shares107 and Frontier Airlines received a $63 million guarantee108 in ex-
change for warrants to buy 3.45 million shares.109  The Board guaranteed 
$900 million in U.S. Airways loans110 and received warrants to purchase 
                                                 
 99. See Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 1, 115 
Stat. 230, (2001). 
 100. Id. § 101(a)(1). 
 101. Id. § 101(b)(1). 
 102. Id. § 102(d)(1). 
 103. Id. § 102(d)(2). 
 104. United States Department of the Treasury, Air Transportation Stabilization Board, Recent 
Activity Report, http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/atsb/recent-activity.html (last 
visited July 3, 2009) [hereinafter Air Transp. Activity Report]. 
 105. American West Meets Loan-Guarantee Conditions, PHOENIX BUS. J., Jan 14, 2002, avail-
able at http://phoenix.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2002/01/14/daily1.html (“To resolve the 
compensation condition, America West will give the ATSB warrants for the purchase of 18.75 mil-
lion shares of the company’s Class B common stock at an exercise price of $3 per share.”); Margaret 
M. Blair, The Economics of Post-September 11 Financial Aid to Airlines, 36 IND. L. REV. 367, 386 
(2003) (“The warrants ultimately issued were for America West Class B common stock, which had a 
$3 exercise price and an exercise period of ten years.”). 
 106. Air Transp. Activity Report, supra note 104. 
 107. Daniel Gross, Bailing for Dollars: How the Feds Saved the Airlines and Made Themselves 
a Mint, SLATE, May 7, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2100198/ (last visited July 3, 2009). 
 108. Air Transp. Activity Report, supra note 104. 
 109. Gross, supra note 107. 
 110. Air Transp. Activity Report, supra note 104. 
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7.635 million shares of Class A common stock.111  Finally, the Board 
guaranteed $27 million in World Airlines debt112 in exchange for war-
rants to purchase 2.38 million shares.113 
The Board did not ultimately market any of the airlines’ common 
shares to the public.  The American Trans Air and U.S. Airways warrants 
were wiped out in bankruptcy.114  Upon emerging from bankruptcy, U.S. 
Airways merged with America West Airlines115 and repurchased the 
America West Airlines stock warrants from the government for $115.8 
million.116  The Board sold the Frontier warrants in an auction to seven 
institutional investors, netting the government $6.6 million.117  World 
Airways was eventually purchased by Global Aero Logistics Inc.118  
Prior to this purchase, the Board had exercised some of the World Air-
ways warrants, apparently without selling the stock, and still held a sub-
                                                 
 111. Gross, supra note 107; U.S. Airways, Inc., SEC Form 10-Q, Quarterly Period Ended 
March 31, 2003, at 5, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/714560/0000931763 
03001588/d10q.htm [hereinafter U.S. Airways Form 10-Q]. 
 112. Air Transp. Activity Report, supra note 104. 
 113. Gross, supra note 107. 
 114. Scott McCartney, Airline Loan-Guarantee Deal Ends With a Profit: Controversial Pro-
gram Kept Some Carriers Aloft; Taxpayers Get $300 Million, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2006, at D4 
(“Bankruptcy wiped out stock ownership in US Airways, ATA and Aloha.”). 
 115. Air Transp. Activity Report, supra note 104 (reporting that the ATSB had approved the 
merger between America West Airlines and U.S. Airways); US Airways to Buy Back Stock Options, 
PHILA. BUS. JOUR. Oct. 3, 2005 (“US Airways and America West merged last week, creating a new-
ly organized US Airways Group (NYSE: LCC).  Last week’s merger ended US Airways’ Chapter 11 
bankruptcy reorganization.”). 
 116. Micheline Maynard, US Airways to Acquire Government’s Holding, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Oct. 5, 2005 (“U.S. Airways has said that it will pay $115.8 million to buy stock warrants that had 
given the U.S. government a sizable stake in America West, which merged with US Airways last 
week.”); US Airways Inc., Form 10-K, at 111 (Dec. 31, 2007), available at http://www.secinfo.com/ 
dsVs6.tBe.htm#1stPage (“In the fourth quarter of 2005, US Airways Group announced an agreement 
to repurchase all of the replacement warrants issued to the ATSB in connection with the merger with 
America West Holdings.  US Airways Group repurchased approximately 7.7 million warrants to 
purchase shares of common stock that had an exercise price of $7.27 per share.”). 
 117. Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Air Transportation Stabilization Board 
Announces Sale of Frontier Warrants (May 31, 2006), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/j 
s4297.htm [hereinafter May 31st Treasury Press Release] (“The [ATSB] today announced the sale of 
the 3,450,551 warrants that it received in connection with the issuance of a loan guarantee to Fron-
tier Airlines.  The warrants were purchased in an auction by seven institutional investors at a price of 
$2.03 per warrant.  Total net proceeds to the government were $6,608,604.”). 
 118. Press Release, Global Aero Logistics, Global Aero Logistics Acquires World Air Hold-
ings for US$ 315 Million (Aug. 14, 2007), available at http://studio-5.financialcontent.com/prnews? 
GUID=2906100&Page=MediaViewer&Ticker=WLDA [hereinafter] Global Aero Logistics Press 
Release] (“Global Aero Logistics Inc., the parent company of ATA Airlines, Inc., announced today 
the completion of its acquisition of World Air Holdings, Inc. . . .  Global acquired World Air in a 
cash merger with a price per share of $12.50 and a total transaction value of approximately $315 
million.”). 
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stantial number of warrants at the time of the acquisition.119  The gov-
ernment presumably received cash for its shares of common stock and 
for its warrants from Global Aero Logistic pursuant to the acquisition.120 
2.  Circumstances Surrounding the Disposition of the Airline Warrants 
In return for the loan guarantees, the Air Transportation Safety 
Board (ATSB) had access to inside information about the airlines.  The 
executive director of the ATSB described the extent of this access in 
Congressional testimony: “The ATSB closely monitors the financial per-
formance of all of its borrowers.  The borrowers submit monthly finan-
cial statements to the ATSB, and the ATSB meets regularly with the bor-
rowers to discuss the state of the business.”121  Although there is no indi-
cation that the ATSB relied on inside information about Frontier when 
deciding when to auction its Frontier warrants to institutional investors, it 
is conceivable that the Board would have found this information useful. 
Further, the membership of the ATSB—the Treasury Secretary, the 
Fed Chief, the Secretary of Transportation (or his or her designee), and 
the Comptroller General (or his or her designee)122—afforded the ATSB 
access to information about future governmental and quasi-governmental 
conduct that could affect the airline stock prices.  Again, although there 
is no indication that the Board relied on nonpublic information when dis-
posing of its airline warrants, its access to superior knowledge about fu-
ture interest rate adjustments, regulation of airlines, security procedures, 
and wider administration policies could indeed have proven useful. 
                                                 
 119. Global Aero Logistics Inc., Form S-1/A, at F-86 (Jan. 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.secinfo.com/dVut2.t54.htm#1stPage (“In August 2004, the ATSB exercised warrants to 
purchase 111,111 shares at $2.50 per share and, pursuant to the net exercise provisions of the war-
rants, received 21,994 shares of the Company’s common stock.  Additionally, in February 2005, the 
ATSB exercised warrants to purchase an additional 111,111 shares at $2.50 per share and, pursuant 
of the net exercise provisions of the warrants, received 76,345 shares of the Company’s common 
stock.”); May 31st Treasury Press Release, supra note 117. 
 120. Agreement and Plan of Merger between Global Aero Logistics Inc., Hugo Acquisition 
Corp., and World Air Holdings, Inc., Apr. 5, 2007, [Exhibit 2.1 to World Air Holdings, Inc. Form 8-
K (filed April 9, 2007)] (detailing conversion of warrants to cash); Global Aero Logistics Press 
Release, supra note 118 (“Global acquired World Air in a cash merger with a price per share of 
$12.50 and a total transaction value of approximately $315 million.”). 
 121. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act: Testimony before the H. Sub-
comm. on Aviation (June 3, 2004) (statement of Michael Kestenbaum, Executive Director, Air 
Transportation Stabilization Board), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js1710.htm. 
 122. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, § 102(b)(2), 
115 Stat. 230, (2001). 
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IV.  INSIDER TRADING BY THE TREASURY IS LARGELY UNCHECKED BY 
CURRENT LAW 
Governmental insider trading is effectively unchecked by current 
laws.  First, the Treasury itself has not adopted any rules or regulations 
prohibiting it from engaging in insider trading.  Second, insider trading is 
prohibited by § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, but the provisions 
of the Securities Exchange Act do not apply to federal departments or 
agencies.  Moreover, even if the current prohibition on insider trading 
were extended to governmental activity, not all of the government’s trad-
ing on the basis of material, nonpublic information about the banks or 
about future governmental or quasi-governmental action would fall with-
in its scope.  Third, any attempt to premise a common law torts claim on 
governmental insider trading would be outside the scope of the Federal 
Torts Claim Act.  Finally, although there is a colorable argument that 
governmental insider trading constitutes a breach of contract and a tak-
ing, this argument, even if successful, would be limited in its application. 
A.  Absence of Treasury Rules or Regulations Prohibiting Insider Trad-
ing 
The Treasury has issued some guidance addressing conflicts of in-
terest, but the guidance does not address the potential for the Treasury to 
engage in insider trading.  Congress recognized the potential for conflicts 
of interest arising in connection with the EES Act and directed the Trea-
sury Secretary to issue regulations or guidelines addressing conflicts of 
interest “as soon as practicable after the date of enactment” of the Act.123  
Although Congress identified certain specific scenarios as areas of poten-
tial conflicts, Congress did not identify any conflicts specifically related 
to the Treasury’s disposition of bank securities.124 
The Treasury Secretary released interim guidelines addressing con-
flicts of interest on October 6, 2008, and published an interim rule im-
plementing those guidelines on January 21, 2009.125  The interim rule 
                                                 
 123. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 108(b), 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5218(b)). 
 124. Id. § 108(a) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5218(a)).  For example, Congress identi-
fied the following specific areas as potential sources of conflicts of interest: “(1) conflicts arising in 
the selection or hiring of contractors or advisors, including asset managers; (2) the purchase of trou-
bled assets; (3) the management of the troubled assets held; [and] (4) post-employment restrictions 
on employees.”  Id.  Congress did, however, include a residual clause, bringing within its scope “any 
other potential conflict of interest, as the Secretary deems necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest.”  Id. § 108(a)(5). 
 125. TARP Conflicts of Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 3431, 3431-2, pts. II-III (Jan. 21, 2009) (to be 
codified at 31 C.F.R. § 31). 
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was effective upon publication.126  The comment period for the interim 
rule expired on March 23, 2009,127 and the Treasury has committed to 
“consider[ing] all comments in developing a final rule.”128  The interim 
rule addresses “conflicts that may arise during the selection of individu-
als or entities seeking a contract or financial agency agreement with the 
Treasury” and “conflicts and other matters that may arise in the course of 
those services.”129 
The interim rule does not address the Treasury’s potential use of 
nonpublic information when disposing of bank securities, but the rule 
does recognize the potential for retained entities to engage in insider 
trading on the basis of nonpublic information learned from the Treas-
ury.130  To combat insider trading by retained entities, the rule states that 
any information that the Treasury provides to the entity “shall be deemed 
nonpublic until the Treasury determines otherwise in writing, or the in-
formation becomes part of the body of public information from a source 
other than the retained entity.”131  The entity is prohibited from disclos-
ing any nonpublic information, except as required by the agreement with 
the Treasury or by court order or subpoena, and from using the nonpublic 
information to “further any private interest other than as contemplated by 
the arrangement.”132  Moreover, the entity is charged with taking security 
measures to prevent the disclosure or inappropriate use of nonpublic in-
formation.133 
B.  Inapplicability of the Securities Exchange Act’s Prohibition on In-
sider Trading 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of 
manipulative or deceptive devices in connection with the purchase or 
sale of securities, including insider trading.134  Section 10(b) does not, 
however, prohibit the Treasury from relying on material, nonpublic in-
formation when disposing of bank securities.  First, the Securities Ex-
change Act exempts the Treasury from § 10(b).  Second, even if § 10(b) 
were amended to apply to the Treasury, the Treasury’s trading on the 
                                                 
 126. Id. at 3432, pt. III. 
 127. Id. at 3431. 
 128. Id. at 3432, pt. III. 
 129. Id. at 3431, pt. I. 
 130. 31 C.F.R. § 31.217(a) (2009). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. § 31.217(b)(2). 
 133. Id. § 31.217(c). 
 134. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
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basis of material, nonpublic information might fall outside the limited 
scope of § 10(b). 
1.  Limited Reach of Current Insider-Trading Prohibitions 
The Securities Exchange Act excludes federal departments and 
agencies, such as the Department of Treasury, from its reach, absent ex-
plicit reference in a particular provision: 
No provision of this chapter shall apply to, or be deemed to include, 
any executive department or independent establishment of the Unit-
ed States, or any lending agency which is wholly owned, directly or 
indirectly, by the United States, or any officer, agent, or employee 
of any such department, establishment, or agency, acting in the 
course of his official duty as such, unless such provision makes spe-
cific reference to such department, establishment, or agency.135 
Section 10(b) of the Act, which prohibits manipulative or deceptive 
devices, including insider trading, does not explicitly reference the De-
partment of Treasury or any United States department or agency.136  As 
such, governmental insider trading is beyond the reach of the federal se-
curities laws. 
This interpretation is consistent with the few cases analyzing 
whether the federal securities laws reach federal actors.  In Colonial 
Bank & Trust Co. v. American Bankshares Corp., purchasers of capital 
of a bank in receivership alleged that the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration had committed securities fraud by misrepresenting the bank’s 
financial condition and the potential effect of the capital infusion and by 
inducing the purchasers to buy the capital.137  The court held that the 
“clear language of the statute” excluded it from the scope of the federal 
securities laws.138  Similarly, in OKC Corp. v. Williams, the plaintiff cor-
poration alleged that individual SEC employees had violated the Securi-
ties Exchange Act by interfering with a tender offer.139  The court dis-
missed the claim because SEC employees are exempt from the Act.140 
                                                 
 135. Id. § 78c(c). 
 136. Id. § 78j(b). 
 137. Colonial Bank & Trust Co. v. Am. Bankshares Corp., 439 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D. Wis. 
1977). 
 138. Id. (“[The FDIC] is not subject to the federal securities laws, nor are its officers or 
agents.”). 
 139. OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F. Supp. 540, 544 (N.D. Tex. 1978). 
 140. Id. at 549. 
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2.  Limited Scope of Current Insider-Trading Prohibitions 
Even if the securities laws prohibiting insider trading were ex-
tended to the Treasury, the Treasury’s trading on the basis of material, 
nonpublic information might fall outside the scope of current insider 
trading regulation.  As explained below, the Securities Exhange Act’s 
prohibition on insider trading does not bar all trading on the basis of ma-
terial, nonpublic information.  Rather, the prohibition extends only to 
trading that falls within the “classical theory” or the “misappropriation 
theory.”  Trading by the Treasury on the basis of inside information 
would fall within the scope of these theories only under narrow circum-
stances. 
a.  Narrow Interpretation of Insider Trading Prohibitions 
The Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the scope of current 
insider trading prohibitions.  One of the policies underlying the securities 
laws, including the prohibitions on insider trading, is the promotion of 
“fair and honest markets.”141  Indeed, as recognized by the SEC, “a pur-
pose of the securities laws was to eliminate ‘use of inside information for 
personal advantage.’”142  Taken to its extreme, this policy would prohibit 
all trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information.143  Absent 
clear congressional intent to impose an across-the-board “disclose or ab-
stain” rule, however, the Supreme Court has declined to interpret § 10(b) 
as prohibiting all trading on the basis of material, nonpublic informa-
tion,144 albeit while recognizing that the insider trading laws may not 
reach all unethical conduct.145  Rather, the prohibitions on insider trading 
                                                 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) (explaining that regulation is necessary “to insure the maintenance 
of fair and honest markets in such transactions”); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 
(1997) (recognizing that “an animating purpose of the Exchange Act” was “to insure honest securi-
ties markets and thereby promote investor confidence”); Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230 
(1988) (“Underlying the adoption of extensive disclosure requirements was a legislative philosophy: 
‘There cannot be honest markets without honest publicity.  Manipulation and dishonest practices of 
the market place thrive upon mystery and secrecy.’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 1383, at 11 (1934))). 
 142. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983) (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act 
Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 912 n.15 (promulgated Nov. 8, 1961)). 
 143. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing 
that the duty to abstain or disclose should arise “as a result of the ‘inherent unfairness’ of turning 
secret information to account for personal profit” (quoting Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act 
Release No. 6668, 40 SEC Docket 907, 912 (promulgated Nov. 8, 1961))). 
 144. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233 (“We cannot affirm petitioner’s conviction without recognizing 
a general duty between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, 
nonpublic information.  Formulation of such a broad duty . . . should not be undertaken absent some 
explicit evidence of congressional intent.”). 
 145. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 661 n.21 (“[e]ven where permitted by law, one’s trading on material 
nonpublic information is behavior that may fall below ethical standards of conduct.  But in a statu-
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extend only to (1) insiders and so-called “temporary insiders” who trade 
in their own company’s stock; (2) outsiders who misappropriate material, 
nonpublic information and trade on the basis of that information; and (3) 
certain tippees of the same. 
The first prohibition, the “classical theory” of insider trading, is im-
plicated “when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corpora-
tion on the basis of material, nonpublic information.”146  Classical theo-
rists posit that the fiduciary relationship between a corporate insider and 
the company’s shareholders gives rise to a duty on the part of the insider 
to either disclose the inside information or abstain from trading on the 
basis thereof.147  This theory is not limited to those traditionally consid-
ered corporate insiders, such as officers and directors, but extends also to 
temporary insiders such as “attorneys, accountants, consultants, and oth-
ers who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation.”148 
The second prohibition, the “misappropriation theory” of insider 
trading, is implicated when a person “misappropriates confidential in-
formation for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the 
source of the information.”149  Here, the fiduciary relationship between 
the recipient and the source of the information gives rise to a duty on the 
part of the recipient to abstain from trading on the information rather 
than to “defraud[] the principal of the exclusive use of that informa-
tion.”150  For example, an attorney who breaches a duty to his firm and 
his client by trading on the basis of confidential information learned dur-
ing the client relationship is liable under this theory.151 
Finally, the third prohibition extends liability to a tippee if the tip-
per breaches a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information to the tippee 
and if the tippee knows or has reason to know that the disclosure is a 
breach.152  Whether the tipper’s disclosure constitutes a breach of fiduci-
ary duty depends on whether the tipper “personally will benefit, directly 
or indirectly, from his disclosure.”153  For example, if the tipper is “moti-
                                                                                                             
tory area of the law such as securities regulation, where legal principles of general application must 
be applied, there may be ‘significant distinctions between actual legal obligations and ethical ide-
als.’” (quoting an SEC report)). 
 146. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651–52. 
 147. Id. at 652 (explaining the theoretical underpinnings of the classical theory). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 653. 
 152. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983). 
 153. Id. at 662. 
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vated by a desire to expose [a] fraud,” the tippee is not subject to insider 
trading liability for trading on the basis of the tipped information.154 
As a practical matter, the interaction of these three prohibitions 
prohibits most market actors from trading on the basis of material, non-
public information in their possession.155  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the misappropriation theory and the classical theory to-
gether cover most instances of trading on the basis of material, nonpublic 
information: 
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts to ca-
pitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase or sale of 
securities.  The classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach 
of duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the misap-
propriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic infor-
mation by a corporate “outsider” in breach of a duty owed not to a 
trading party, but to the source of the information.156 
Moreover, these theories of insider trading are supplemented with 
prophylactic prohibitions, including Securities Exchange Act § 16(b) and 
Rule 14e-3, which reach beyond the scope of the classical and misappro-
priation theories.  Section 16(b), the so-called short-swing profit prohibi-
tion, generally provides that any profit realized by an insider within six 
months after the purchase or sale of an equity security of the issuer is 
recoverable by the issuer—regardless of the insider’s use of inside in-
formation to generate the profit.157  Rule 14e-3 prohibits trading “on the 
basis of material nonpublic information concerning a pending tender of-
fer that he knows or has reason to know has been acquired ‘directly or 
indirectly’ from an insider of the offeror or issuer, or someone working 
on their behalf,”158 even if the trading does not involve a breach of fidu-
ciary duty.159 
                                                 
 154. Id. at 667. 
 155. Ronald F. Kidd, Insider Trading: The Misappropriation Theory Versus an “Access to 
Information” Perspective, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 101, 118 (1993) (“The misappropriation theory essen-
tially solves the problem of outsider trading.”); William K.S. Wang, Stock Market Insider Trading: 
Victims, Violators and Remedies—Including an Analogy to Fraud in the Sale of a Used Car with a 
Generic Defect, 45 VILL. L. REV. 27, 66 (2000) (“The ‘classical relationship’ and misappropriation 
theories cover, most, but not all, insider trading and tipping.”). 
 156. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53. 
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2006) (stating “the purpose of preventing the unfair use of informa-
tion which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his 
relationship to the issuer”). 
 158. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 669 (quoting United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir. 
1991) (en banc)); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2009). 
 159. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673. 
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Only a few market participants slip through this broad net: (1) tip-
pees where the tipper has not received a benefit; and (2) persons in pos-
session of material, nonpublic information who do not violate any fiduci-
ary duties by trading on that information.  The latter category is generally 
limited to parties who are themselves the source of the inside informa-
tion.160  For example, research firms are generally not prevented by the 
insider trading laws from front-running the market effect of their own 
research,161 and members of Congress are not prohibited from trading on 
the basis of future congressional action.162 
Congress has not acted to fill these holes.  First, there is little impe-
tus to act with respect to the de minimus category of gratuitous tippees.  
Second, the value of analyst research is well recognized and permitting 
front-running is one way to encourage this research.163  Third, absent 
public outcry, Congress has little incentive to impose additional restric-
tions on its own behavior.164  Considering the narrowness of these excep-
tions and the rationales for Congress’s failure to enact legislation cover-
ing these few gaps, Congress’s inaction should not be construed as tacit 
approval for widespread trading on the basis of material, nonpublic in-
formation. 
Even if the securities laws prohibiting insider trading were ex-
tended to the Treasury, the Treasury’s trading on the basis of material, 
                                                 
 160. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Be-
tween Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589, 1605 (1999) (recognizing that 
the “logic [of the misappropriation theory] suggests that the Wall Street Journal could lawfully trade 
on the same information used by Winans”); Roberta S. Karmel, Insider Trading: Law, Policy, and 
Theory after O’Hagan, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 83, 95 (1998) (recognizing that, under the misappro-
priation theory, “the source could presumably trade on the information”). 
 161. Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39, 53–
54 (2007) (“Analysts systematically release information to their institutional investors prior to its 
public release.”  And,“[s]ecurities firms may trade ahead of an analyst’s buy recommendation, effec-
tively front-running the firm’s own public statements.”).  The practice of front-running the overall 
market effect of broadly-disseminated research is distinguished from front-running a customer’s 
purchases, which is prohibited by the Investment Advisors Act (as well as arguably by the Securities 
Exchange Act because it involves a violation of the fiduciary duty owed to the customer).  See 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1960); David M. Bovi, Rule 10b-5 Liability for Front-Running: Adding a New Di-
mension to the “Money Game,” 7 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 103, 107 (1994). 
 162. Matthew Barbabella, Daniel Cohen, Alex Kardon, & Peter Molk, Insider Trading in Con-
gress: The Need for Regulation 24 (Dec. 20, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1318682 
(recognizing that there is not a “solid legal basis for liability” if a member of Congress trades on the 
basis of material nonpublic legislative information). 
 163. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (recognizing the crucial role that market ana-
lysts play in preserving healthy markets). 
 164. Barbabella et. al, supra note 162, at 3–4 (detailing the failure of the Stop Trading on Con-
gressional Knowledge Act [“STOCK Act”] to gain any traction when first proposed in 2006 or when 
reintroduced in 2007); but see id. at 4 (explaining that the STOCK Act was reintroduced on January 
26, 2009, as H.R. 682). 
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nonpublic information might fall outside the scope of current insider 
trading regulation.  Trading by the Treasury on the basis of inside infor-
mation about the financial institutions would fall within the scope of the 
classical theory only if the Treasury were found to be a temporary in-
sider.  Trading by the Treasury on the basis of nonpublic information 
about future governmental action would fall within the scope of the mis-
appropriation theory only if the Treasury were found to have violated a 
relationship of trust and confidence by using the information. 
b.  The Treasury as Temporary Insider 
The Treasury’s trading on the basis of inside information about the 
banks implicates the classical theory of insider trading.  But the classical 
theory would only extend to this trading if the government was classified 
as a “temporary insider,” akin to an attorney, accountant, consultant, or 
underwriter working for the corporation.165  An outsider becomes a tem-
porary insider if (1) the outsider and the corporation “have entered into a 
special confidential relationship in the conduct of the business of the en-
terprise”; (2) the outsider is “given access to information solely for cor-
porate purposes”; (3) the corporation “expect[s] the outsider to keep the 
disclosed nonpublic information confidential”; and (4) the relationship 
“at least . . . impl[ies] such a duty.”166 
The Treasury Department might qualify as a temporary insider un-
der this standard.  On the one hand, the Treasury has been given access 
to the financial institutions’ inside information pursuant to a special rela-
tionship.  The Treasury is simultaneously an investor, a regulator, and—
if not a savior—a patron.167  Moreover, the Treasury has agreed to make 
“reasonable best efforts” to maintain the confidentiality of the informa-
tion received pursuant to that relationship.168  On the other hand, neither 
Congress nor the Treasury has been reticent about the imperative that the 
Treasury maximize profits for shareholders.169  Yet, the financial institu-
tions failed to negotiate for a provision explicitly banning the Treasury 
from relying on confidential inside information when disposing of the 
purchased securities. 
                                                 
 165. Id. at 4. 
 166. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14. 
 167. CPP Factsheet, supra note 10. 
 168. Securities Purchase Agreement, supra note 24, at ¶ 3.5(b). 
 169. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2(2)(C), 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5201(2)(C)); CPP Factsheet, supra note 10, at 1; Notice to 
Financial Institutions, supra note 34, at 2. 
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If the Treasury were classified as a temporary insider, the Treas-
ury’s disposition of a bank’s securities on the basis of material inside 
information about the bank would fall within the scope of the classical 
theory of insider trading.  However, to the extent the government sold the 
warrants directly to the bank itself rather than to an institutional investor 
or the public, there would presumably be no “insider trading” on the ba-
sis of inside information about the bank because both parties to the trans-
action would have equal access to this information.  There is not a per se 
bar on insider trading liability for stock transactions between an insider 
and an issuer, but liability should attach only where the insider has 
knowledge of secret information about the company that he or she fails 
to share with the company.170  In most instances, where the issuer and the 
insider have equal access to inside information about the issuer, there is 
no informational disparity, and thus, no insider trading.171  Indeed, when 
exempting certain issuer-insider trades from the short-swing profit prohi-
bition,172 the SEC recognized that these trades “do not appear to present 
the same opportunities for insider profit on the basis of nonpublic infor-
mation as do market transactions by officers and directors.”173 
c.  The Treasury as Misappropriator 
The Treasury’s trading on the basis of nonpublic information about 
future governmental action implicates the misappropriation theory.  This 
theory would reach the Treasury’s conduct only if the Treasury’s use of 
the information violated a duty owed to the holder of the information.  
With respect to information about its own future conduct, this theory is 
inapplicable because the Treasury cannot violate a duty owed to itself.  
With respect to information learned from other governmental sources, 
the theory is again likely inapplicable because the holder and the user of 
the information are both arms of the United States government. 
                                                 
 170. LANGEVOORT, supra note 68 (“As a general matter, the issuer is deemed to know all that 
its agents know, except to the extent that the agents are acting solely in a self-serving or corrupt 
fashion. . . . [I]n a case where the information was known only to a small group of persons who both 
engineered the fraud and sought to profit via purchases or sales from the company, there would be 
no attribution and hence there would be the requisite informational disparity.”).  For example, the 
SEC charged Enron CEO Kenneth Lay with securities fraud for repaying loans to Enron through 
sales of Enron stock to the company, allegedly with knowledge of undisclosed problems at Enron.  
See Second Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 102-106, SEC v. Kenneth L. Lay, No. H-04-0284 (S.D. Tex. 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18776.pdf. 
 171. LANGEVOORT, supra note 68. 
 172. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3 (d)–(e) (2009). 
 173. Dreiling v. Am. Express Co., 458 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Ownership Re-
ports and Trading by Officers, Directors and Principal Security Holders, 61 Fed. Reg. 30,376, 
30,377 (June 14, 1996)). 
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C.  Limited Reach of the Federal Torts Claims Act 
Pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), the United States 
has consented to tort liability “in the same manner and to the same extent 
as a private individual under like circumstances,” but has excluded 
claims “arising out of . . . misrepresentation [or] deceit.”174  A tort claim 
for insider trading would likely fall within this exclusion. 
The essence of insider trading,175 whether articulated as a federal 
statutory claim or as a tort claim, is the breach of the duty to disclose 
information before trading on it.176  A tort claim premised on the breach 
of a duty to disclose information, just like an affirmative misstatement, 
sounds in misrepresentation or deceit, and such claims are consistently 
excluded from the reach of the FTCA.177  Therefore, a tort claim prem-
ised on governmental insider trading is likely excluded from the waiver 
of immunity in the FTCA.  This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s 
characterization of insider trading as “deception,” albeit while interpret-
ing the “deceptive device” language of the Securities Exchange Act ra-
ther than the “deceit” language of the FTCA.178 
D.  Arguable Breach of the Securities Purchase Agreement 
The Treasury might be liable for breach of contract if it uses inside 
information about the financial institutions when trading in securities.  
The standard Securities Purchase Agreement between the Treasury and 
the financial institutions does not prohibit the Treasury from trading on 
                                                 
 174. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (2006). 
 175. The misrepresentation exception is premised on the essence of the claim, not on its label.  
JBP Acquisitions v. United States, 224 F.3d 1260, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] plaintiff cannot cir-
cumvent the misrepresentation exception simply through the artful pleading of its claims.”); Gaudet 
v. United States, 517 F.2d 1034, 1035 (5th Cir. 1975) (“Gaudet urges that his claim is grounded in 
negligence, not in intentional tort, but the argument is without merit.  It is the substance of the claim 
and not the language used in stating it which controls.”). 
 176. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (tracing the roots of the classical theory of insider trad-
ing to the common law); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980) (interpreting the 
federal securities laws consistently with the “common-law rule” that trading on the basis of nonpub-
lic information is not fraudulent absent a duty of disclosure (citing the “common law” and the 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS)). 
 177. Muniz-Rivera v. United States, 326 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 2003) (“The case law makes ma-
nifest that the prophylaxis of the misrepresentation exception extends to failures of communica-
tion.”); JBP Acquisitions, 224 F.3d at 1265 n.3 (“The misrepresentation exception encompasses 
failure to communicate as well as miscommunication.”). 
 178. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (affirming that classical insider trad-
ing is a “deception device”).  The Court in O’Hagan explained that insider trading under the misap-
propriation theory “premises liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who entrusted 
him with access to confidential information.”  Id. at 653.  Moreover, the Court recognized that “de-
ception through nondisclosure is central” to the misappropriation theory.  Id. at 655. 
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the basis of inside information learned from the financial institutions.  
The agreement does, however, contain a representation by the Treasury 
that it will “use reasonable best efforts” to maintain the confidentiality of 
the inside information: 
The Investor will use reasonable best efforts to hold, and will use 
reasonable best efforts to cause its agents, consultants, contractors 
and advisors to hold, in confidence all non-public records, books, 
contracts, instruments, computer data and other data and informa-
tion (collectively, “Information”) concerning the Company fur-
nished or made available to it by the Company or its representatives 
pursuant to this Agreement . . . .179 
It is conceivable that the Treasury’s trading on the basis of a finan-
cial institution’s confidential information could operate as a signal to the 
bank’s competitors about the content of that confidential information—
thus breaching the Treasury’s promise to keep the information confiden-
tial.180  In this narrow circumstance, where the Treasury’s trading oper-
ates to disclose the financial institution’s confidential information, the 
Treasury might be liable to the financial institution for breach of con-
tract. 
The true victims of insider trading—the investors—would not be 
able to seek recourse as third-party beneficiaries, however.  Even if a 
third-party beneficiary claim against the Treasury could be articulated on 
these facts, the Securities Purchase Agreement explicitly disclaims any 
liability to third parties: “Nothing contained in this Agreement, expressed 
or implied, is intended to confer upon any person or entity other than the 
Company and the Investor any benefit, right or remedies . . . .”181 
E.  Limited Takings Clause Argument 
Governmental insider trading might also, in narrow circumstances, 
qualify as a taking under the Fifth Amendment; however, such a taking 
would probably not violate the Constitution.  The Fifth Amendment pro-
hibits the taking of private property “for public use, without just compen-
sation.”182  Under the Takings Clause, the government may take property 
                                                 
 179. Securities Purchase Agreement, supra note 24, at ¶ 3.5(b). 
 180. Bainbridge, supra note 160, at 1607 (“Once activity in a stock reaches an unusual stage, 
others may guess the reason for the trading—the corporate secret.”). 
 181. Securities Purchase Agreement, supra note 24, at ¶ 5.10. 
 182. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  Conceivably, a bank could also attempt to articulate a substantive 
due process claim based on the deprivation of its property right in its confidential information, but an 
analysis of the viability of such a claim is beyond the scope of this article. 
2009] The Bank Bailout 33 
 
for public use if it provides just compensation.183  A taking is unconstitu-
tional, however, if it is for a private use or if just compensation is not 
available.184  The takings inquiry involves four issues, each of which is 
discussed below: (1) Is the financial institution’s confidential information 
property for purposes of the Takings Clause?  (2) Does the Treasury’s 
trading on the basis of confidential information constitute a taking?  (3) 
Is the taking for a public use?  (4) Is just compensation available to the 
financial institution?  An analysis of these issues demonstrates that, un-
der narrow circumstances, insider trading by the Treasury might qualify 
as a taking of a financial institution’s confidential information, but just 
compensation is likely available.  Moreover, most of the insider trading 
anticipated by this Article would not constitute a taking. 
1.  Property Subject to Protection Under the Takings Clause 
 At least some corporate inside information is property for purposes 
of the Takings Clause.185  For example, in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 
the Supreme Court held that commercial information “cognizable as a 
trade-secret property right under [state] law” is protected by the Takings 
Clause.186  At the very least, therefore, to the extent a bank’s inside in-
formation qualifies as a trade secret under state law,187 it would be sub-
ject to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 
The treatment of corporate inside information as property for pur-
poses of the Takings Clause is consistent with the property rights ration-
ale for insider trading regulation.  Many commentators have urged that 
prohibitions on insider trading are justified as a means of protecting a 
company’s property rights in its confidential information.188  Indeed, al-
                                                 
 183. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
 184. Id.; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984). 
 185. See Richard J. Morgan, Insider Trading and the Infringement of Property Rights, 48 OHIO 
L.J. 79, 94–95 (1987) (“Information can be an asset. . . .  So long as the information remains gener-
ally unknown, the information has potential value in the hands of the person who possesses it and 
who has the potential ability to benefit from the informational advantage that he or she possesses.”). 
 186. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003–04. 
 187. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (“A trade secret is any information 
that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and 
secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”). 
 188. Bainbridge, supra note 160, at 1606 (“There is a growing consensus that the federal in-
sider trading prohibition is more easily justified as a means of protecting property rights in informa-
tion than as a way of protecting investors.”); Morgan, supra note 185, at 95 (“If information can be 
an asset whose ownership can be determined and transferred and whose uses can be allocated and 
restricted by agreement with the owner, it is possible to approach the regulation of insider trading as 
a matter of determining and protecting the ownership and use rights in the inside information on 
which that trading is based.”); Albert D. Spalding, Insider Tradings: Is There A Better Way?  A 
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beit without adopting the property rights rationale for insider trading reg-
ulation,189 in O’Hagan the Supreme Court recognized that a “company’s 
confidential information . . . qualifies as property to which the company 
has a right of exclusive use”190 and compared insider trading on the basis 
thereof with embezzlement of tangible property.191 
2.  A “Taking” Under the Takings Clause 
The Treasury’s trading on the basis of a company’s confidential in-
formation probably would not qualify as a “taking” unless the trading 
operated as a signal to the company’s competitors about the content of 
the confidential information.  When making the “ad hoc, factual” inquiry 
into whether a taking has occurred, courts examine the following factors: 
“the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its 
interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations.”192  Two 
components of this analysis are especially relevant here: (1) whether the 
banks have a reasonable investment-backed expectation in the govern-
ment not trading on the basis of inside information; and (2) whether gov-
ernmental trading on the basis of inside information about the banks in-
terferes with the banks’ property interests in the information.193 
Banks probably do not have a broad “reasonable investment-backed 
expectation” that the government will not trade on the basis of inside 
information about the banks.  In order to be reasonable, an expectation 
must be based on more than a “unilateral expectation of an abstract 
need.”194  For example, where a statute was silent regarding the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency’s authorized use of confidential informa-
tion submitted to the agency, the Supreme Court held that, “absent an 
                                                                                                             
Proposed “Trade Secrets” Approach, 11 MIDWEST L. REV. 140, 149–51 (1993) (suggesting that 
trade secret law should inform the regulation of insider trading). 
 189. Bainbridge, supra note 160, at 1645 (“Both proponents and opponents of the property 
rights rationale will be able to quote passages indicating support for their position, but neither should 
take much comfort from O’Hagan.”) 
 190. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997). 
 191. Id. (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987) (“The undisclosed misap-
propriation of such information, in violation of a fiduciary duty, the Court said in Carpenter, consti-
tutes fraud akin to embezzlement.”)); see also id. (“As counsel for the Government stated in expla-
nation of the theory at oral argument: ‘To satisfy the common law rule that a trustee may not use the 
property that [has] been entrusted [to] him, there would have to be consent.” (quoting with approval 
the Government’s statement at oral argument)); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983) (rec-
ognizing that confidential information is a corporate asset). 
 192. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (quoting PruneYard Shopping 
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)). 
 193. See id. at 1005–12. 
 194. Id. at 1005–6 (quoting Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 
(1980)). 
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express promise,” the submitter did not have a reasonable expectation 
“that its information would remain inviolate in the hands of EPA.”195  
Similarly, the EES Act, the CPP, and the CAP do not make express 
promises that the Treasury will not trade on the basis of the information 
provided to it.  Moreover, the banks have been forewarned that the Trea-
sury will maximize profits for the taxpayers.196  Therefore, banks partici-
pating in the CPP and the CAP probably do not have a reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectation that the government will not rely on that 
information when selling the banks’ securities. 
It is conceivable, however, that the Treasury’s trading could operate 
as a signal to the bank’s competitors about the bank’s confidential infor-
mation.197  In other words, the confidentiality of the information could be 
threatened by the government’s insider trading.  In this specific scenario, 
the government’s use of the information would run afoul of the Treas-
ury’s express promise to the financial institutions to maintain the confi-
dentiality of the company’s inside information.  The CPP standard Secu-
rities Purchase Agreement contains a representation that the Treasury 
“will use reasonable best efforts to hold” the inside information in confi-
dence.198  If the government’s trading on the basis of the company’s in-
side information destroys its confidentiality, the trading might interfere 
with a “reasonable, investment-backed expectation” that the Treasury 
maintain confidentiality. 
Even if the banks did have a broad expectation that the government 
would not trade on the basis of confidential information about the banks, 
only under narrow circumstances would the government’s trading be in-
consistent with the banks’ property interest in such a way as to constitute 
a taking.  The property interest in confidential commercial information, 
such as a trade secret, is comprised of the right to a “competitive advan-
tage over others” as a result of the right to exclusive access to and use of 
the information.199  Governmental use of inside information about a bank 
when making trading decisions would interfere with the bank’s right to 
exclusive use, but such a use would not necessarily interfere with the 
bank’s right to a competitive advantage over others.  The Supreme Court 
has emphasized that mere interference with the right to exclusive use of a 
                                                 
 195. Id. at 1008. 
 196. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2(2)(C), 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5201(2)(C)); Notice to Financial Institutions, supra note 
34, at 3. 
 197. Bainbridge, supra note 160, at 1607 (“Once activity in a stock reaches an unusual stage, 
others may guess the reason for the trading—the corporate secret.”). 
 198. Securities Purchase Agreement, supra note 24, at ¶ 3.5(b). 
 199. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011–12. 
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trade secret is insufficient to constitute a taking if that interference does 
not affect the owner’s competitive advantage over others.200  For exam-
ple, if the EPA used a trade secret when evaluating a competitor’s prod-
uct, thus enabling the competitor to register its product more easily, the 
EPA’s use would constitute a taking.201  If, however, the trade secret re-
lated to harmful side effects of the submitter’s product and the EPA dis-
closed the trade secret to the public, the disclosure would not be a taking 
because the resulting “decline in profits stems from a decrease in the val-
ue of the pesticide to consumers, rather than from the destruction of an 
edge the submitter had over its competitors.”202  The crucial question, 
therefore, is whether governmental trading on the basis of a bank’s con-
fidential information would affect the bank’s competitive advantage from 
that information.  The direct victims of insider trading are those who en-
gage in contemporaneous trades with the insider, but the company itself 
can be indirectly harmed by insider trading.  If the insider trading affects 
the bank’s stock price, it could interfere with a transaction tied to the 
market price of the stock203 or cause a downgrade in the bank’s credit 
rating.204  But these harms do not flow from the destruction of the bank’s 
competitive edge. 
As noted above, however, it is possible that the government’s in-
sider trading could operate as a signal to the bank’s competitors about the 
bank’s confidential information,205 thus interfering with the bank’s com-
petitive advantage.  In this specific scenario, the government’s trading on 
the basis of the bank’s confidential information would probably qualify 
as a use inconsistent with the bank’s property interest in the information. 
3.  A Public Use 
A taking is unconstitutional if it is accomplished for a private 
use.206  As long as the use “has a conceivable public character,” however, 
                                                 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1011 n.15. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Morgan, supra note 185, at 97 (noting that “insider buying might drive up the market 
price of the corporation’s securities, thereby making more difficult the corporation’s acquisition in a 
transaction that is tied to the market price of the corporation’s securities”). 
 204. See Standard & Poor’s, Ratings Direct: How Stock Prices Can Affect An Issuer’s Credit 
Rating 2–3 (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/images/media/Stock_Prices 
_Affect_Issuer_CreditRating.pdf (explaining that a company’s stock price is important to the com-
pany’s credit rating because it affects the company’s access to capital and because it, especially for 
confidence-sensitive companies like banks, reflects the company’s ability to operate). 
 205. Bainbridge, supra note 160, at 1607 (“Once activity in a stock reaches an unusual stage, 
others may guess the reason for the trading—the corporate secret.”). 
 206. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005). 
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it qualifies as a public use.207  For example, in Kelo v. City of New Lon-
don, Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that a city’s exercise of emi-
nent domain to transfer private property from one private owner to an-
other pursuant to an economic development plan satisfied the public use 
requirement.208  Here, where governmental trading on the basis of confi-
dential information about the banks would inure to the benefit of the tax-
payers, the character of the use is most likely public.  As a result, even if 
the confidential information is property and the governmental use is a 
taking, governmental insider trading is not barred by the Fifth Amend-
ment if the bank is able to recover just compensation.  It is irrelevant for 
Fifth Amendment purposes that contemporaneous traders, those most 
likely to be harmed by the trading, would have no recourse. 
4.  Just Compensation 
If a taking is for a public use, the taking is permitted if the owner is 
able to recover reasonable compensation.209  Ordinarily, a governmental 
taking is compensated pursuant to the Tucker Act, which affords the 
Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to enter a judgment against the 
United States for just compensation.210  However, even if Congress with-
draws the Tucker Act remedy, other means of recovering reasonable 
compensation might also be available. 
The EES Act, pursuant to which the CPP is administered, contains 
explicit limitations on remedies available to banks and thus appears to 
withdraw the Tucker Act remedy.  First, § 119(a)(1) sets forth the fol-
lowing standard for reviewing the Secretary’s actions: 
Actions by the Secretary pursuant to the authority of this Act shall 
be subject to chapter 7 of title 5, United States Code, including that 
such final actions shall be held unlawful and set aside if found to be 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or not in accordance 
with law.211 
Further, § 119(a)(3) limits the claims that participating banks may 
pursue against the Secretary: 
No action or claims may be brought against the Secretary by any 
person that divests its assets with respect to its participation in a 
                                                 
 207. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014. 
 208. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484–85. 
 209. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1016. 
 210. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2008). 
 211. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 119(a)(1), 122 
Stat. 3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5229(a)(1)). 
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program under this Act, except as provided in paragraph (1), other 
than as expressly provided in a written contract with the Secre-
tary.212 
These provisions appear to bar banks from seeking just compensation 
from the Secretary under the Tucker Act. 
Financial institutions would probably not, however, be barred from 
otherwise seeking just compensation from the Treasury.  As discussed 
above in Part IV.D, if the Treasury’s insider trading operates to disclose 
the financial institution’s inside information, the Treasury would argua-
bly be liable for breach of contract, thus affording the financial institu-
tion just compensation for this taking.  Therefore, to the extent the Trea-
sury’s insider trading constituted a taking of bank property, it would only 
be without just compensation to the extent the trading was found not to 
violate the Securities Purchase Agreement.  Only in this unique circum-
stance would the taking violate the Constitution. 
V.  GOVERNMENTAL INSIDER TRADING SHOULD BE CHECKED 
Governmental insider trading should be prohibited.  First, govern-
mental use of inside information to trade in bank stocks implicates the 
policy rationales underlying the prohibition on insider trading and under-
cuts the purposes of the very programs that make this trading possible.  
Second, the potential benefits of permitting governmental insider trading 
to proceed unchecked fail to outweigh the aforementioned harms. 
A.  Undercutting the Purposes of the EES Act 
In the unique context of insider trading by the government, the pur-
poses of the bailout, the rationales for prohibiting insider trading, and 
even some of the arguments against the prohibition of insider trading 
converge to support prohibiting governmental trading on the basis of ma-
terial, nonpublic information. 
First, a central rationale for prohibiting insider trading—and for 
bailing out the banks—is to promote overall faith in the integrity of the 
markets213 and thus encourage investors to participate in the markets.214  
                                                 
 212. Id. § 119(a)(3) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5229(a)(3)). 
 213. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) (recognizing that “an animating 
purpose of the Exchange Act” was “to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor 
confidence”); Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, Securi-
ties Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24599, at 20 
(August 15, 2000) (“[T]he prohibitions against insider trading in our securities laws play an essential 
role in maintaining the fairness, health, and integrity of our markets.  We have long recognized that 
the fundamental unfairness of insider trading harms not only individual investors but also the very 
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If investors think that they are the dupes of other market participants, 
they will likely be deterred from participating in the market.215  In these 
tough economic times when ordinary investors have lost significant 
amounts of money, the impression that “ordinary investors always lose” 
is already rampant.  This impression would only be exacerbated if the 
government itself were perceived as using ordinary investors as pawns.  
The goal of promoting overall faith in the markets would be undercut of 
the Treasury was permitted to trade on the basis of inside information. 
A second rationale for the bailout is buttressing bank stock pric-
es.216  As loudly proclaimed by opponents of insider trading regulation, 
who argue that insider trading is victimless, the presence of insider trad-
ing in the market is reflected in stock prices.217  In other words, rational 
investors discount stock prices to reflect the danger of insider trading.  
Regardless of the merits of this argument in the overall debate about 
whether insider trading should be prohibited at all, the discounting of 
bank stock prices to account for governmental insider trading would un-
                                                                                                             
foundations of our markets, by undermining investor confidence in the integrity of the markets.”); 
Joel Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information, 73 
GEO. L.J. 1083, 1115 (1985) (“The primary policy reason for proscribing trading while in possession 
of material nonpublic information is to make investors confident that they can trade securities with-
out being subject to informational disadvantages.  The goal is to guarantee the integrity of the mar-
ket.”); Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 375, 382 (1999) (summarizing and compiling sources for the argument that insider trading 
prohibition “supports investor confidence in the securities markets”); but see Ian B. Lee, Fairness 
and Insider Trading, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 119, 138 (2002) (characterizing concern about loss 
of investor faith in the markets as a result of insider trading as a “rather unsophisticated response” 
that “militates . . . for investor education rather than a prohibition on insider trading”). 
 214. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 2(1) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5201(1)) (articulating the goal of restoring “liquidity and stability to the financial system of the 
United States”); CPP Factsheet, supra note 10 (“[CPP] is designed to . . . provid[e] confidence to our 
nation’s financial system.”). 
 215. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 658 (“[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a 
market where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.”); Ro-
nald F. Kidd, Insider Trading: The Misappropriation Theory Versus an “Access to Information” 
Perspective, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 101, 120 (1993) (“[I]f the investor believes that others regularly 
enjoy information that is not legally available to him or to other ordinary investors, he may withdraw 
from the market entirely.”). 
 216. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 36, at 1 (recognizing the need to reassure investors). 
 217. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 857, 868 (1983) (“Kenneth Scott has pointed out that if the existence of insider trading is 
known, as it surely is, outsiders will not be disadvantaged because the price they pay will reflect the 
risk of insider trading.”) (citing Kenneth Scott, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure and Corpo-
rate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801, 807–09 (1980)); Lee, supra note 213, at 165 (summarizing and 
compiling sources for the argument that “[m]arket prices will adjust to reflect the sophisticated in-
vestors’ assessment of the implications of the practice [of insider trading] for the value of the firm, 
guaranteeing that unsophisticated investors will, despite their ignorance, be compensated for the risk 
they assume”). 
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dercut a central purpose of the financial stabilization efforts—to restore 
confidence in the financial system by reassuring bank investors.218  Pro-
hibiting governmental trading on the basis of inside information would 
further this goal. 
Moreover, the additional key arguments for legalizing all insider 
trading are not implicated in the context of governmental insider trading.  
Prohibiting the Treasury from using its informational advantage in the 
marketplace would neither deprive analysts of incentive to ferret out in-
formation and analyze information,219 nor deprive entrepreneurs of in-
centive to excel.220 
B.  Failure of Potential Profits to Outweigh the Resultant Harm 
Although governmental insider trading could increase profits for 
the taxpayers, the cost of decreased public confidence in the markets is 
not worth the profits.  The primary goal of the EES Act is to “restore li-
quidity and stability to the financial system of the United States.”221  
Maximizing taxpayer returns is only a secondary goal.222  Allowing this 
secondary goal to override the primary goal would gut the EES Act of its 
purpose.  Indeed, if the taxpayers’ return had been more important to 
Congress than stabilizing the markets, Congress would not have enacted 
the EES Act at all. 
Moreover, permitting the Treasury to engage in insider trading for 
the benefit of the taxpayers forces the bank shareholders—the few—to 
bear the burden of the taxpayers—the many.  This unfair burden shifting 
is contrary to the principle underlying the Takings Clause (admittedly 
without violating the Takings Clause because the shareholders do not 
have a property interest in unrealized profits) that some people should 
                                                 
 218. FinancialStability.gov, Capital Assistance Program, at http://www.financialstability.gov/ 
roadtostability/capitalassistance.html [hereinafter Capital Assistance Program]. 
 219. Lee, supra note 213, at 171 (summarizing and compiling sources for the argument that 
banning trading on inside information might result in “less incentive to invest resources in its acqui-
sition”). 
 220. MANNE, supra note 63, at 139 (arguing that insider trading “is merely a variant of the 
underlying market for entrepreneurial service”); Strudler & Orts, supra note 213, at 382 (summariz-
ing and compiling sources for the argument that permitting insider trading “would provide an appro-
priate form of executive compensation”). 
 221. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2(1), 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5201(1)). 
 222. Id. § 2(2) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5201(2)).  Additional important goals listed 
in the Act are “protect[ing] home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings” and 
“preserv[ing] homeownership and promot[ing] jobs and economic growth.”  Id. 
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not be forced to bear alone “public burdens, which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”223 
VI.  SPECIFIC STEPS WOULD PREVENT THE TREASURY FROM ENGAGING 
IN INSIDER TRADING 
Several extreme solutions could prevent governmental insider trad-
ing.  For example, fully nationalizing the banks would keep the Treasury 
from profiting from its superior knowledge when trading with the public, 
as there would be no public investors.  Nationalization is not the only 
possible solution, however, and such a drastic measure is not warranted 
by the potential problem of governmental insider trading.  Moreover, the 
political pressures against such a step make it unrealistic, absent other 
exigencies. 
Rather, this article evaluates five more moderate solutions drawn 
from the body of precedent already developed in the context of trading 
by company insiders: (1) prohibiting the Treasury from using nonpublic 
information when making investment decisions; (2) applying of the “dis-
close or abstain” rule to the Treasury; (3) directing the Treasury to dis-
pose of the warrants as soon as practicable; (4) requiring the Treasury to 
impose an “ethical wall” between the person making the investment de-
cisions and those in possession of the information; and (5) requiring the 
Treasury to follow an investment plan akin to a Rule 10b5-1 plan. 
As this article goes to press, the Treasury is poised to implement 
the third potential solution by committing to dispose of at least some of 
the warrants as quickly as practicable.  This article argues that this poten-
tial solution, even if expanded to cover all warrants held by the Treasury, 
fails to solve the problem of insider trading, while simultaneously failing 
to maximize taxpayer returns.  This article recommends that the Treasury 
instead adopt a combination of the fourth and fifth solutions. 
A.  Prohibiting Use of Inside Information 
One possible solution would be to prohibit the Treasury from using 
nonpublic information when making investment decisions.  Congress 
could impose such a prohibition on the Treasury, the Treasury could in-
                                                 
 223. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining the policy rationale un-
derlying the Takings Clause); but see Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 677 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (“The court justifies Secrist’s and Dirks’ action because the general benefit derived from the 
violation of Secrist’s duty to shareholders outweighed the harm caused to those shareholders, . . . in 
other words, because the end justified the means.  Under this view, the benefit conferred on society 
by Secrist’s and Dirks’ activities may be paid for with the losses caused to shareholders trading with 
Dirks’ clients.”). 
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clude a promise to that effect in the Securities Purchase Agreements, or 
the Treasury could issue the promise in a statement of Treasury policy. 
Setting aside the enforceability of such a prohibition or promise, 
this potential solution runs contrary to the inherent inseparability of 
awareness and use of information.  When promulgating Rule 10b5-1, the 
SEC recognized the “common sense notion that a trader who is aware of 
inside information when making a trading decision inevitably makes use 
of the information.”224  Therefore, Rule 10b5-1 equates trading “on the 
basis of” confidential information with trading while “aware” of that in-
formation.225  This same common sense notion prevents a promise by the 
Treasury not to use confidential information when making investment 
decisions, without more, from solving the potential for insider trading. 
B.  Imposing a “Disclose or Abstain” Rule 
A second potential solution would be to impose the “disclose or ab-
stain” rule on the Treasury identical to that imposed on private individu-
als in possession of material nonpublic information under the classical 
theory and the misappropriation theory of insider trading.226  Although 
this solution addresses the inherent inseparability between awareness and 
use, it is not viable because it would effectively bar the Treasury from 
ever trading in the bank securities.  As outlined above in Part II.A.3, the 
Treasury has vast access to inside information about financial institutions 
and about future government conduct and policy.  In other words, the 
Treasury is constantly aware of material, nonpublic information.  Under 
the “disclose or abstain” rule, the Treasury could only trade if it first dis-
closed the confidential information that it possessed. 
Disclosure is not a reasonable option for the Treasury, however.  To 
the extent that the Treasury is aware of inside information about the fi-
nancial institutions, the Treasury is contractually prohibited from disclos-
ing the confidential information.227  Moreover, to the extent the nonpub-
lic information related to future government conduct, the timing and 
means of disclosure depend on questions of diplomacy, national security, 
and politics, not on the whims of the Treasury.  Thus, the imposition of a 
“disclose or abstain” rule would prevent the Treasury from trading at all. 
                                                 
 224. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 34-43154, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24599, at 22 (Au-
gust 15, 2000). 
 225. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2000). 
 226. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). 
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 179–180. 
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C.  Disposing of the Warrants as Quickly as Practicable 
A third potential solution is to require the Treasury to dispose of the 
warrants as soon as possible.  Without acknowledging that it possesses 
inside information, the Treasury recently recognized the impropriety of 
permitting it to “time” the market: “[I]t [is] not appropriate for the gov-
ernment to be exercising discretionary judgment on timing market 
sales.”228  The Treasury’s apparent solution is to commit to dispose of the 
securities “as quickly as practicable” (hereinafter, the “ASAP policy”).229  
The Treasury has explicitly recognized the ASAP policy with respect to 
the warrants of banks that have fully repaid the Treasury’s CPP invest-
ment.230  The Treasury has not published a formal policy regarding the 
disposition of warrants of banks that have not repaid the Treasury, but it 
has generally stated its preference for a swift sale of the securities owned 
by the government.231 
At first glance, the Treasury’s commitment to sell the warrants of 
repaying banks as soon as possible appears to assuage fears that the 
Treasury will profit from its access to nonpublic information—at least 
with respect to banks that repay the Treasury’s investment—but further 
analysis shows that the ASAP policy is not an optimal solution.  First, 
the “as quickly as practicable” timeline is still amorphous enough to af-
ford the Treasury considerable discretion in the timing of warrant sales.  
Although the Treasury’s capacity to profit from its superior information 
is compressed to a shorter period of time, it is not extinguished.  Second, 
the ASAP policy itself is an overarching timing of the market.  For ex-
ample, if the Treasury were currently in possession of nonpublic infor-
mation that could negatively impact bank stocks in the long-term, the 
Treasury’s ASAP policy would itself be a misuse of that information. 
Moreover, in addition to failing to solve the insider trading prob-
lem, the Treasury’s ASAP policy fails to achieve Congress’s objective of 
maximizing taxpayer wealth.232  Swift disposition of the warrants, in 
light of the economic uncertainties currently facing the nation, fails to 
capture the potential upside of the Treasury’s investment.  A better ap-
proach to maximizing taxpayer returns, while avoiding insider trading by 
the Treasury, is to dispose of the securities at an optimal time as deter-
mined through an analysis of public information.  Combining an ethical 
                                                 
 228. June 26th Treasury Press Release, supra note 26. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id.; Capital Assistance Program Term Sheet, supra note 39, at 6. 
 232. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 2(2)(C), 122 Stat. 
3765 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. § 5201(2)(C)). 
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wall and an investment plan, as discussed below, would allow the Treas-
ury both to prevent the misuse of nonpublic information and to maximize 
taxpayer returns. 
D.  Imposing an Ethical Wall 
A fourth option is to require the Treasury to impose an “ethical 
wall”233 between the individuals who are aware of nonpublic information 
and those who make the investment decisions.234  This wall would pre-
vent any material, nonpublic information from flowing to the decision-
makers. 
When implementing the ethical wall, the Treasury could draw from 
the procedures used in other scenarios involving the segmentation of in-
formation within an entity, such as within a law firm when an attorney 
with a conflict of interest is screened from participation on a matter235 or 
within a broker-dealer when the investment banking department pos-
sesses confidential information that its retail brokers cannot use when 
making recommendations to their clients.236  For example, the ethical 
wall should restrict the decision-makers’ access to Treasury files, protect 
sensitive Treasury information with additional safeguards likes pass-
words and impose strict codes of conduct enforceable with sanctions.237  
                                                 
 233. Courts, attorneys, and securities professionals commonly refer to such a barrier as a “Chi-
nese wall.”  In light of the questionable usefulness of this term and its potentially racist undertones, 
this article uses the term “ethical wall.”  See Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court of 
Contra Costa County, 200 Cal. App. 3d 272, 293–95 (1988) (Low, P.J., concurring) (questioning the 
usefulness of the term “Chinese wall,” recognizing that “the term has an ethnic focus which many 
would consider a subtle form of linguistic discrimination,” and suggesting the use of the phrase 
“ethics wall”). 
 234. This proposal is similar to the 10b5-1 affirmative defense for entities, where one or more 
of an entity’s agents is in possession of material nonpublic information.  This affirmative defense is 
satisfied if (1) the individual making the investment decision on behalf of the entity is not aware of 
the information, and (2) the entity has “implemented reasonable policies and procedures” to ensure 
that the decision-maker is not violating insider trading laws.  17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c)(2) (2009). 
 235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a)(2) (stating that an attorney’s conflict 
of interest is not imputed to other attorneys within the firm if, among other steps, the disqualified 
attorney is “timely screened from any participation in the matter”); id. R. 1.0(k) (“‘Screened’ de-
notes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a matter through the timely imposition of 
procedures within a firm that are reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information 
that the isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.”). 
 236. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(f), 80b-4a (2006) (requiring every registered broker, registered 
dealer, and investment advisor to “establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures 
reasonably designed” to prevent the misuse of material nonpublic information); Christopher M. 
Gorman, Note, Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the Problems of Insider Trading and Conflicts 
of Interest in Broker-Dealers?, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 476 (2004) (explaining the po-
tential flow of information from the investment banking department to the retail department). 
 237. Gorman, supra note 236, at 486–87 (identifying typical policies and procedures of a 
“Chinese wall”). 
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The imposition of an ethical wall would insulate the CPP asset managers 
and the Financial Stability Trust trustees from the material, nonpublic 
information in the possession of the Treasury. 
The ethical wall alone would be insufficient, however, to prevent 
insider trading because, under current plans, the Treasury retains ultimate 
decision-making authority.238  Even if the information did not pass to the 
asset managers or the trustees, the securities transactions would nonethe-
less be tainted to the extent they were ultimately subject to the discretion 
of individuals in possession of that information at the Treasury.  There-
fore, as discussed below, the ethical wall would only be successful if 
combined with an investment plan. 
E.  Fashioning an Investment Plan 
A fifth alternative is for the Treasury to fashion an investment plan, 
akin to a Rule 10b5-1 plan, thereby removing the day-to-day investment 
decisions from the Treasury’s discretion.  When promulgating Rule 
10b5-1, the SEC recognized that, because insiders are always “aware” of 
inside information, the prohibition on trading while “aware” of inside 
information would effectively bar insiders from trading in their com-
pany’s securities.  In order to allow insiders to trade in their company’s 
stock, the SEC detailed an affirmative defense whereby an insider could 
trade without violating Rule 10b-5.239  In particular, an insider may 
shield himself or herself from liability if, before becoming aware of ma-
terial nonpublic information, he or she adopts a written investment 
plan.240  The plan must insulate the insider from future investment deci-
sions, either by including a formula for future investments or by ceding 
all discretion over future investment decisions to a third person.241 
The Treasury, like a company insider, is always in possession of 
material nonpublic information, and an investment plan is a viable option 
for insulating the Treasury from future investment decisions.242  The 
Treasury has already announced that it intends to designate asset manag-
ers and trustees to manage the Treasury’s investments.243  As part of that 
designation, the Treasury should adopt an investment plan that either (1) 
includes a specific formula for disposing of financial institution’s stock 
or (2) cedes all discretion to make investment decisions to the managers 
                                                 
 238. See supra text accompanying notes 15, 31. 
 239. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(c) (2009). 
 240. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(i)(A). 
 241. Id. § 240.10b5-1(c)(1)(B)(2) & (3). 
 242. See supra text accompanying notes 47–56. 
 243. See supra text accompanying notes 30, 45. 
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and trustees.  As guidance when drafting such a plan, the Treasury could 
rely on similar plans implemented by company insiders pursuant to Rule 
10b5-1.244 
If the investment plan is not combined with an ethical wall, how-
ever, the Treasury could nonetheless engage in insider trading.  For ex-
ample, the Treasury could feed material nonpublic information to the 
trustees and managers for their consideration when exercising their dis-
cretion.  Similarly, variables in the formula could be affected by material 
nonpublic information leaked by the Treasury. 
F.  Combination of an Ethical Wall and an Investment Plan 
As foreshadowed above, the best solution is to combine an ethical 
wall and an investment plan.  The ethical wall would prevent the Treas-
ury from leaking any inside information to the asset managers or trustees.  
The investment plan would prevent the Treasury from relying on mate-
rial nonpublic information when deciding whether to adopt the invest-
ment recommendations of the asset managers or trustees.  The combina-
tion of the two would prevent the Treasury and its agents from relying on 
inside information when disposing of bank securities.  At the same time, 
this solution would allow the Treasury to maximize taxpayer returns to 
the extent possible without engaging in insider trading. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The Treasury has the motive and the opportunity to rely on material 
nonpublic information when disposing of financial institutions’ securi-
ties, which would undercut the purposes of the bailout.  Insider trading 
by the Treasury would be outside the reach of the federal securities laws 
and the Federal Torts Claims Act.  If the insider trading operated to dis-
close a financial institution’s confidential information to a competitor, 
the institution might be able to assert a claim for breach of the Securities 
Purchase Agreement against the Treasury, but this potential remedy 
would not offer any recourse to injured investors.  Moreover, even this 
limited remedy would not be available if the Treasury’s insider trading 
were premised on nonpublic information about future governmental or 
                                                 
 244. See, e.g., Mary J. Mullany, SEC Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans: Another Item to Consider 
During the Preparation of Annual Disclosure Documents, 1711 PLI/CORP 919, 922 (2009) (listing 
common provisions of a Rule 10b5-1 plan); see also SEC Division of Corporate Finance: Manual of 
Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations Fourth Supplement, available as an attachment to 
Mary J. Mullany, SEC Rule 10b5-1 Trading Plans: Another Item to Consider During the Prepara-
tion of Annual Disclosure Document, 1641 PLI/CORP 1187, 1255 (2008) (answering questions about 
how to draft a compliant written trading plan). 
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quasi-governmental conduct or if the Treasury’s insider trading did not 
operate as a signal to the bank’s competitors.  In light of the lack of suf-
ficient checks on potential insider trading by the Treasury, this article 
recommends a two-part solution: (1) the imposition of an ethical wall 
between the persons making the investment decisions and the Treasury; 
and (2) the establishment of an investment plan that divests the Treasury 
of discretion over investment decisions. 
